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I
INTRODUCTION
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”)1 re-
flects an innovative congressional effort to refine securities fraud class actions.
In adopting the PSLRA, Congress recognized that although the class action is a
valuable tool for increasing plaintiff access to the legal system, its structure pre-
sents opportunities for abuse.  In particular, collective action problems and
small claimant stakes limit plaintiff participation in litigation decisions.  Deci-
sions are made by entrepreneurial lawyers who effectively control the litigation.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have a substantial interest in the litigation—frequently a
larger interest than any individual class member.  Lawyer control of class ac-
tions coupled with the potential divergence between the interests of the lawyers
and those of the class creates a risk that litigation decisions will not reflect the
best interests of the plaintiff class or society as a whole.
Although the entrepreneurial lawyer is central to the functioning of the class
action, structural problems raise concerns of litigation malfunction.  Courts
have been unsuccessful in addressing these problems despite their efforts to
oversee litigation decisions and their broad control over the conduct of class ac-
tions and the award of attorneys’ fees.  Accordingly, Congress responded by
adopting a mechanism in the PSLRA for the appointment of a statutory lead
plaintiff.2  The statute reflects the expectation that the lead plaintiff, presump-
tively the investor with the largest financial interest in the litigation, will oversee
the conduct of the case and monitor the decisions of class counsel.3  This en-
hanced client monitoring has the potential to reduce agency costs and improve
litigation decisions.
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1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1998).
3. See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
FISCH_FMT.DOC 04/19/01  1:22 PM
54 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 64: Nos. 2&3
Litigation under the PSLRA has tested the efficacy of the lead plaintiff pro-
vision, introducing a number of promising developments.  Institutional investors
have demonstrated an increasing willingness to seek appointment as lead plain-
tiff and to play an active role in litigation.  In some cases, the participation of in-
stitutional investors seems to be having the effects intended by Congress, in-
cluding active negotiation of fee agreements and quality resolution of lawsuits.
In the recent Cendant case, for example, three public pension funds, acting as a
lead plaintiff group, oversaw litigation that culminated in the largest securities
fraud settlement in history.4
Substantial uncertainty remains, however, about the operation of the lead
plaintiff provision and the appropriate method for selecting lead counsel.  Plain-
tiffs’ firms have developed a variety of techniques to secure lead counsel ap-
pointments.  Some firms assemble large groups of investors to act as lead plain-
tiff; other firms are developing ongoing relationships with institutional investors
who are likely to be repeat players in securities fraud litigation.  Courts have
varied in their analyses as to how the lead plaintiff should be selected.  Deci-
sional uncertainty, coupled with the high stakes involved in the selection of lead
counsel, has led to significant collateral litigation.5  This litigation may deter
some investors from seeking lead plaintiff status.  The issues raised in the battle
over selection of lead plaintiff have also caused some courts to claim for them-
selves the task of selecting lead counsel.  Several courts have gone so far as to
auction off the lead counsel position.6
This article focuses on two of the most problematic developments under the
lead plaintiff provision: (1) the use of aggregation to unite large numbers of un-
related investors into a lead plaintiff group; and (2) the appointment of lead
counsel through sealed bid auctions conducted by the courts.  Both develop-
ments weaken the relationship between the statutory lead plaintiff and class
counsel.  As a result, they reduce the ability of the lead plaintiff to monitor the
litigation, potentially frustrating the objectives of the PSLRA.
In Part II, the article briefly reviews the background of selection of counsel
issues in class action litigation and Congress’s effort to respond to these issues
in the PSLRA.  Part III examines aggregation, a key issue in the application of
the lead plaintiff provision.  Although a few recent decisions suggest that aggre-
4. See Cendant Corporation Agrees to Record Payment to Settle Class Financial Fraud Allegations,
31 Sec. Litig. & Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1618 (Dec. 13, 1999) (describing Cendant settlement).
5. The collateral litigation would likely be more extensive but for the courts’ virtually universal
conclusion that defendants do not have standing to challenge the appointment of the lead plaintiff.  See,
e.g., Takeda v. Turbodyne Techs., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Gluck v. Cellstar
Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 550 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 57, 60-61 (D.
Mass. 1996).  But see In re Landry’s Seafood Restaurant, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. H-99-1948, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7005, at *6-7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2000) (holding that defendants lacked standing to challenge
appointment of the lead plaintiff, but concluding that the court could consider the same matters sua
sponte); Howard Gunty Profit Sharing v. Quantum Corp., No. 96-20711(SW), slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 6, 1997) (“[W]hen . . . there are no other potential lead plaintiffs to challenge a moving party, the
Court must rely on the defendants to insure that the requirements of [the Reform Act] are satisfied.”).
6. See infra note 192.
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gation is doctrinally dead, the vast majority of courts continue to appoint lead
plaintiff groups consisting of several unrelated investors.  The article considers
whether these appointments are appropriate and concludes that they are both
impractical and inconsistent with the purpose of the statute.  Part IV analyzes
lead counsel auctions.  Several recent decisions suggest increased judicial will-
ingness to consider auctioning off the role of lead counsel.  The article demon-
strates that auctions create a variety of unresolved implementation issues.
More important, lead counsel auctions improperly allow the court to usurp the
role of the lead plaintiff in the selection and retention of lead counsel.
The importance of understanding the relationship of recent case develop-
ments to the structure and purpose of the PSLRA cannot be understated.  The
current process of selecting the lead plaintiff and appointing lead counsel is ef-
fectively insulated from appellate review.7  In addition to raising significant is-
sues of statutory interpretation and application, the cases reflect a troubling
trend: Courts are making an effort to maintain their supervisory role in class ac-
tion litigation at the expense of the increased client empowerment contem-
plated by the statute.
II
BACKGROUND SELECTION OF COUNSEL ISSUES
A. Selection of Counsel in Securities Class Actions
Cost and other barriers limit the ability of many potential plaintiffs to use
the litigation system to obtain redress.8  The modern class action offers one
means of addressing this problem.  The class action partially overcomes free
rider and other collective action problems by allowing groups of small claim
plaintiffs to join together for the purpose of suit.9  Similarly, the class action al-
lows plaintiffs to share the costs of litigation.  Coupled with the contingent fee
structure, the class action grants small claimants access to litigation without re-
quiring them to risk costs that are disproportionate to their expected recovery.
By permitting cost sharing and reducing risk, the class action provides a tool for
increasing access to the legal system.  This increased access can result in greater
deterrence of corporate misconduct and enhanced victim compensation.10
7. See, e.g., Metro Servs. v. Wiggins, 158 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 1998) (dismissing challenge to lead
plaintiff appointment under the collateral order doctrine); 9th Cir. Lifts Stay in Network Associates
Lead Plaintiff Dispute, PENSION FUND. LITIG. REP., Apr. 10, 2000, at 11 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s
denial of request for mandamus in connection with the trial court’s appointments of lead plaintiff and
class counsel in Network Associates litigation).
8. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 124-28 (1994) (describing costs of
participation in the adjudicative process).
9. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Ac-
tion and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1991).
10. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 173-76 (Autumn 1997) (describing the role of class actions in deterring corpo-
rate misconduct and compensating injured victims).
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The effectiveness of the class action depends to a large degree on its struc-
ture.  The class action is a representative suit in which individual class members
do not participate actively in litigation decisions.  The stakes of class members
are generally too small to warrant active monitoring.  Instead, class actions are
effectively run by class counsel.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers bear most of the risk of the
lawsuit and exercise virtually complete control over litigation decisions.11
Lawyer-driven litigation is not inherently undesirable.  The willingness of
plaintiffs’ lawyers to investigate potential causes of action, mobilize the plaintiff
class, and bear the costs and risks associated with the suit leads to an increase in
enforcement and provides a valuable contribution to the deterrence of corpo-
rate misconduct.12  Indeed, by providing suitable financial incentives for these
activities, class actions have led to the evolution of entrepreneurial plaintiffs’
lawyers, who play a central role in rendering the class action a meaningful vehi-
cle for compensating victims and deterring wrongful conduct.13
The challenge for those seeking to refine the class action is to develop a
structure that encourages class counsel to make its litigation decisions out of
concern for the interests of the plaintiff class.14  The procedures applicable to
class actions, for the most part, fail to meet that challenge.  Instead, class action
procedures increase lawyer control over litigation decisionmaking and, at the
same time, increase agency costs by creating perverse incentives for class coun-
sel.15
These problems start at the outset of the suit.  As Elliott Weiss and John
Beckerman have observed,16 courts most commonly select lead counsel by ap-
pointing the lawyer who files the first complaint.17  The natural and foreseeable
consequence of this approach is the creation of a race to the courthouse.18
11. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669,
677-78 (1986).
12. See Fisch, supra note 10, at 175 (describing defense of entrepreneurial class actions as a mecha-
nism for deterring corporate misconduct).
13. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) (describing economic incentives
for entrepreneurial litigation).
14. See Fisch, supra note 10, at 176-83 (describing proposals for class action reform).
15. The literature on class actions and potential class action reform is extensive.  See generally Mi-
chael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Inter-
locutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1531, 1532-34 (2000) (describing and citing scholarly literature on class actions).
16. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional
Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2062 (1995).
17. No statute or procedural rule gives the courts affirmative authority to select class counsel.  The
closest thing to an authoritative source on the subject, the Manual for Complex Litigation, indicates
that the selection of lead counsel is normally made by the parties or their attorneys and warns that “the
court should not, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, select and appoint lead counsel” itself.
Nanette L. Stasko, Comment, Competitive Bidding in the Courthouse: In re Oracle Securities Litigation,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 1667, 1673-74 n.21 (1994).  Nonetheless, dictum in MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d
65 (2d Cir. 1958), is widely cited for the authority that the court has the power to appoint “lead coun-
sel” in a class action.
18. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2062.
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There are at least three problems with this result.  First, lawyers are encouraged
to file complaints rapidly and defer their investigation of the merits of those
complaints until after filing.  Second, to file a complaint rapidly, lawyers must
seek out prospective plaintiffs rather than waiting to be approached by a dis-
gruntled investor.  Finally, class counsel is appointed with little consideration
given to qualifications.19
Courts create additional problems by vesting class counsel with virtually
complete control over litigation decisionmaking.  Despite judicial rhetoric
about the importance of the class representative, class representatives have no
official role in class action decisionmaking.20  Courts have upheld the authority
of counsel to make such vital decisions as whether to settle a case without re-
quiring that counsel consult with, much less obtain the approval of, the class
representative.21  Class representatives do not regularly attend court proceed-
ings and settlement conferences.22  The class representative does not even have
the right to replace class counsel.23
Lawyer control over litigation decisions is problematic to the extent that
lawyer and client interests diverge.  Class members generally would prefer liti-
gation decisions to be made in a manner that maximizes expected recovery.24
Counsel has an incentive to make decisions in a manner that maximizes its fee
award, even if those decisions do not maximize recovery.  The most commonly
cited example of the potential conflict between lawyer and client interests is
counsel’s incentive to agree to a cheap settlement if the agreement provides a
generous fee award.  As the court explained in the Oracle case:
[w]hen the prospect of settlement arises, the unique dynamics of the lawyer/client rela-
tionship in class actions raise particular problems: an attractive attorney fee provision
in the settlement agreement may induce class counsel to settle regardless of the likeli-
19. See Conference Report on The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, H.R. REP.
NO. 104-369, at 33 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 732 [hereinafter CONF. REP.] (explaining
that race to the courthouse results in courts giving insufficient consideration to the most thoroughly re-
searched but later-filed complaint); see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2063 n.47 (exploring
the extent to which courts consider reputation in the selection of lead counsel).
20. See Fisch, supra note 10, at 174.
21. The Third Circuit’s recent decision in Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d Cir. 1999),
illustrates the minimal power possessed by the traditional class representative.  The court in Lazy Oil
approved a settlement proposed by class counsel over the objections of three of the four named class
representatives, despite the fact that the class representatives were sophisticated parties, and despite
the agreement of an additional 384 class members.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 406-09
(2000) (describing the Lazy Oil decision and other decisions approving settlements over the objection
of class representatives).
22. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 10, at 174 n.43 (citing study describing lack of class representative
attendance at settlement conferences).
23. See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1995).
24. Class members in securities fraud litigation may, of course, continue to hold stock in the defen-
dant corporation.  In such cases, class members may prefer governance-type reforms that have the ef-
fect of deterring future misconduct to money damages.  Moreover, to the extent that class members are
risk-neutral diversified investors, their overall interest in litigation that produces money damages is
limited to the extent that such damages simply result in transfer payments from one class of stockhold-
ers to another.  See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1487, 1504-05 (1996).
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hood that further pursuit of the litigation might substantially increase the total class
recovery.25
Counsel also may be more risk averse than the members of the plaintiff class.
Because plaintiffs’ lawyers make an investment in the case, they may favor the
certainty associated with an early settlement over the prospect of a larger but
riskier recovery after extended litigation.26
Although statutes require judicial review of settlement decisions, as Jona-
than Macey and Geoffrey Miller explain, courts are in a poor position to review
settlement proposals effectively.27  Judges are structurally biased in favor of set-
tlement, both as a personal matter—it clears their overcrowded calendars—and
because of an institutional ethos that courts should encourage resolution of liti-
gation by settlement.28  Moreover, because a deferential standard of review is
applied to judicial approval of settlements, these biases are unlikely to be cor-
rected on appellate review.29  Even well-motivated judges are poorly served by
the settlement evaluation process.  Because the record before the court is both
incomplete and under the control of the litigants, judges lack sufficient informa-
tion to evaluate the fairness of a proposed settlement.30  The task is further
complicated by the fact that settlement hearings are typically nonadversarial
processes in which the presentation of information is jointly orchestrated by
plaintiffs and defendants.31
The process for determining the appropriate compensation for class counsel
is also problematic.  Securities fraud class actions are common fund cases, in
which the court determines the appropriate fee for plaintiffs’ counsel at the
conclusion of the case and orders the fee to be paid from the damages recov-
ered for the plaintiff class.32  Courts have developed different methods of com-
puting an appropriate fee.  The major divide is between those who advocate
using the lodestar basis, which compensates lawyers for the time they devote to
the case, and those who favor paying lawyers a percentage of the recovery ob-
tained.33  As numerous commentators have observed, however, both the lode-
25. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
26. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Law-
yer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 230 (1983) (explaining this possibility).
27. See Macey & Miller, supra note 9, at 44-48.
28. See id. at 45-46.
29. See, e.g., Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 63 (Del. 1991) (refusing to “second-guess” the discre-
tion of the Court of Chancery in approving the “meager” settlement of lawsuit challenging corporate
philanthropic expenditure despite objections by various shareholders, including the California Public
Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”)).
30. See Macey & Miller, supra note 9, at 46.
31. See id. at 46-47.
32. See, e.g., Monique Lapointe, Note, Attorney’s Fees in Common Fund Actions, 59 FORDHAM L.
REV. 843, 844-45 (1991) (describing procedure for determining fee awards in common fund cases).
33. Although the lodestar method enjoyed a period of widespread popularity, seemingly because
courts were comfortable with the concept of calculating fees on an hourly basis, the more recent trend
in common fund cases has been toward a return to the percentage-of-recovery method.  See Janet Coo-
per Alexander, Contingent Fees and Class Actions, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 347, 349 (1998).
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star and the percentage-of-recovery methods produce incentive problems.34
These problems are heightened when a case is settled.35
Moreover, the ex post judicial determination of attorneys’ fees in a class ac-
tion differs markedly from the pricing process in a competitive market.36  First,
the decision about how much to pay is divorced from the selection decision.
The court generally does not consider a firm’s standard billing rate or contin-
gency fee when it makes the decision to appoint the firm as lead counsel at the
beginning of the case, nor does the court weigh the firm’s typical fees against
those of its competitors.  Instead, the court selects the firm based on other fac-
tors and reserves control over the fee award.  Second, the fee award generally
reflects an assessment of factors unique to the case at bar, such as the perform-
ance of the attorneys and the degree of risk associated with the case.37  A firm
does not typically seek to justify a fee request by pointing to the amount of
compensation it received in prior cases.38  Finally, the court’s award is made with
knowledge of the outcome of the litigation.  Unlike traditional retention
agreements, which are made before the parties know the timing and amount of
the recovery, the court’s fee determination can reflect the court’s evaluation of
the quality of the services that the firm actually has provided.
Although courts could consequently take advantage of hindsight to base fee
awards on counsel’s performance, they have shown little willingness to do so.
Instead, courts have found it difficult to resist institutional pressure to award
“benchmark” levels of compensation.39  Departures from a specified percentage
34. For detailed explanations of the lodestar and percentage of recovery methods and the incentive
and administrative problems associated with each, see Coffee, supra note 13, at 887-89; Macey &
Miller, supra note 9, at 50-61; Andrew K. Niebler, In Search of Bargained-For Fees for Class Action
Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: The Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel, 54 BUS. LAW.
763, 770-74 (1999).
35. See Macey & Miller, supra note 9, at 48-49 (explaining that judges are reluctant to reject fee
agreements in settlement packages for fear of upsetting the settlement).
36. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (concluding that neither the lode-
star method nor a benchmark percentage-of-recovery are effective substitutes for determining the fair
market value of counsel’s services at the outset of common fund litigation).
37. In a common fund case, these factors are generally reflected in the court’s selection of a multi-
plier.  See, e.g., Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 166 F.3d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1999).  In a percentage-of-recovery
case, the court looks to these factors in setting the percentage.  See, e.g., Brown v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 838 F.2d 451, 454-55 (10th Cir. 1988).
38. Under the lodestar method, however, the court must determine a reasonable hourly rate, which
is based on the rates charged by lawyers of similar skill and experience in the community.
39. See Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e concede
that district courts across the nation have apparently eased into a practice of ‘systematically’ awarding
fees in the 25% range, ‘regardless of type of case, benefits to the class, numbers of hours billed, size of
fund, size of plaintiff class, or any other relevant factor.’” (quoting Third Circuit Task Force, Court
Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 247 n.32 (1986) (collecting cases)); see also Stuart J. Logan &
Beverly C. Moore, Jr., Attorney Fee Awards In Common Fund Securities & Antitrust Class Actions, 13
CLASS ACTION REP. 249, 546 (1990) (analyzing 334 common fund securities cases and finding that in
the 48 cases that generated a common fund between $1 million and $2 million, the attorneys received
28.3% of the fund as an average fee and expense award); Declaration of John C. Coffee, Jr., Aug. 17,
1998, at 7 n.4, In re Cendant Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144  (D.N.J. 1998) (No. 98-CV-1664 (WHW) [hereinafter
Coffee Declaration] (describing the “fullest recent study” as showing that 32% is the prevailing bench-
mark).
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of the recovery are rare, regardless of the fact that cases vary tremendously with
respect to factors such as the difficulty of the case, the hours invested by coun-
sel, and the degree of risk associated with the recovery.40  Of particular concern
is the repeated award of substantial attorneys’ fees in cases in which the court
acknowledges that counsel’s efforts have produced minimal benefit to the plain-
tiff class.41  This problem is aggravated by the fact that, in most cases, the litiga-
tion outcome involves a negotiated settlement.  If, as indicated above, a court
cannot effectively review the quality of a settlement, it is further handicapped in
evaluating the legal services that produced that settlement.42
As a result, attorneys’ fee awards in class actions are poorly correlated with
the performance of class counsel.  Despite the value of performance-based
compensation,43 it has effectively been abandoned as a monitoring tool in class
actions.  These developments are coupled with a process in which counsel se-
lects the client rather than the client selecting a lawyer, and in which class
members exercise little or no authority over counsel’s litigation decisions.
Therefore, the class action structure may, on occasion, result in inappropriate
litigation decisions, and judicial fee awards may over- or under-compensate
plaintiffs’ counsel.
B. The Response of the PSLRA
Although the public relations spin associated with the PSLRA focused on
the evils of strike suits and lawyer-driven litigation,44 the statute may fairly be
read as an effort to reform class action procedures to secure more effective cli-
ent control.45  Congress viewed greater client control as a means to address the
40. Judge Kram’s recent fee decision in the Drexel Burnham class action is a notable counterex-
ample.  See Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 46-47 (describing fee applications and Judge Kram’s fee award).
Using the lodestar method, Judge Kram awarded plaintiff’s counsel a fee of approximately four percent
of the $54 million recovery provided to the class by virtue of a settlement.  Despite counsel’s objections
to the fee as a substantial departure from the 25% “benchmark” in the profession, Judge Kram con-
cluded that a multiplier was unwarranted.  Judge Kram’s decision was upheld on appeal by the Second
Circuit.  See id. at 57.  In particular, the Second Circuit observed that the 25% benchmark reflected a
contingency risk that was unlikely to be present in every securities fraud class action, and noted that, in
the absence of a substantial contingency risk, a 25% contingency fee was unreasonable.  See id. at 51-54.
41. See, e.g., In re QVC, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. 13950-NC, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *6-7,
13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1997) (awarding $1 million in legal fees to counsel despite judicial findings sug-
gesting that counsel’s efforts were of little value to plaintiff class); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16,
at 2072-74 (criticizing award of counsel fees in “piggyback” derivative suit in Oracle).  But see Kaplan v.
Rand, 192 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (overturning district court $1 million fee award and finding no fees
justified because settlement “provided no substantial benefit to the corporation or its shareholders”).
42. Additionally, fee awards are subject to a particularly deferential standard of appellate review.
See Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 47-48 (“‘[A]buse of discretion’—already one of the most deferential stan-
dards of review—takes on special significance when reviewing fee decisions.”).
43. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Ex-
ecutive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1999) (describing a trend toward and rationale
for performance-based executive compensation).
44. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 533, 535 (1997) (recounting descriptions of abusive litigation provided to Congress during legisla-
tive hearings).
45. See, e.g., CONF. REP., supra note 19, at 32 (statute would protect investors “against lawyer-
driven lawsuits by giving control of the litigation to lead plaintiffs.”); COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
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potential for abuse of the litigation process.46  The PSLRA created a formal
mechanism for the appointment of a lead plaintiff.47  The lead plaintiff provision
was intended to reduce agency costs by encouraging investors with substantial
stakes, particularly institutional investors, to participate more actively in litiga-
tion decisionmaking.48
The PSLRA contains detailed guidelines for the selection of the lead plain-
tiff.  Following the initial filing of a securities fraud class action, the filing plain-
tiff must publish notice of the suit and advise class members of the opportunity
to seek appointment as lead plaintiff.49  Any member of the plaintiff class can
subsequently file a motion to be appointed lead plaintiff.  Within ninety days af-
ter publication of the notice, the court is required to appoint as lead plaintiff the
“member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines
to be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members.”50
The statute provides a rebuttable presumption that the most adequate plaintiff
is the person or group with the largest financial interest in the claim.51  The leg-
islative history of the PSLRA suggests that Congress particularly intended to
encourage institutional investors to seek appointment as lead plaintiff.52  Fol-
lowing appointment, the lead plaintiff is responsible for choosing class counsel.
The statute provides that “[t]he most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the ap-
proval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.”53  Thus,
Congress sought to reverse the then-prevalent practice of counsel choosing the
plaintiff rather than the plaintiff choosing counsel.54
The adoption of the lead plaintiff provision already has changed the conduct
of securities fraud litigation.  First, the statute appears to be encouraging insti-
tutional investor participation in litigation, the effect contemplated by Con-
gress.  An increasing number of institutional investors are seeking appointments
HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT
OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 [hereinafter S. REP.]
(Congress intends “to transfer primary control of private securities litigation from lawyers to inves-
tors.”); id. at 10 (“[T]he lead plaintiff–not lawyers–should drive the litigation.”).
46. See, e.g., CONF. REP., supra note 19, at 31 (describing evidence of abusive practices including
the filing of meritless litigation, the targeting of deep pocket defendants without regard to their actual
culpability, discovery abuses, and manipulation by lawyers of their clients); S. REP., supra note 45, at 6-
12 (describing findings of abusive practices).
47. The provision was modeled on a proposal in a Yale Law Journal article by Professors Elliott
Weiss and John Beckerman.  See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2105-08.
48. See CONF. REP., supra note 19, at 32 (lead plaintiff provisions are “intended to encourage the
most capable representatives of the plaintiff class to participate in class action litigation and to exercise
supervision and control of the lawyers for the class.”); id. at 34 (“[I]ncreasing the role of institutional
investors . . . will ultimately benefit shareholders and assist courts by improving the quality of represen-
tation . . . .”).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp IV. 1998).
50. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).
51. See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii).
52. See CONF. REP., supra note 19, at 34.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
54. See CONF. REP., supra note 19, at 35.
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as lead plaintiff.55  Consistent with this participation, institutional investors are
rationalizing shareholder litigation within their approach to corporate govern-
ance.  Institutions are developing guidelines to determine when their participa-
tion in shareholder litigation is desirable.56  Institutions are developing ongoing
relationships with plaintiffs’ firms and increasing sophistication in evaluating
and negotiating fee arrangements.57  Although it is too early to tell, institutional
participation may also be affecting litigation outcomes.58
Though a less beneficial consequence, the lead plaintiff provision also slows
down the litigation process.  Because the filing plaintiff must notify other class
members, and because potential lead plaintiffs must be given time to seek ap-
pointment, there is a waiting period after the initial filing during which the case
is essentially on hold.59  In particular, no firm can know whether it will be ap-
pointed lead counsel; therefore, no lawyer is in a position to begin discovery or
initiate settlement negotiations.  The delay associated with the lead plaintiff
55. Initially, institutional involvement was limited.  See SEC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 (Apr. 1997) (visited Feb. 16, 2001)
<http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt> (reporting that “institutional investors have not become
active in many cases”).  More recently, large institutional investors have sought to participate in a num-
ber of cases.  See, e.g., In re Network Assocs. Inc.  Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1030-31 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (appointing the Board of Pensions and Retirement of the City of Philadelphia as presumptive
lead plaintiff); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d  803, 819-20 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (rejecting
Florida State Board of Administration’s application to be appointed lead plaintiff); In re Cendant Corp.
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 147, 151 (D.N.J. 1998) (appointing lead plaintiff group consisting of California
Public Employees’ Retirement System, the New York State Common Retirement Fund, and the New
York City Pension Funds).
56. See, e.g., Teachers’ Retirement Board draft policy for CalSTERS’ involvement in securities liti-
gation matters (visited Jan. 5, 2000) <http://www.calstrs.cagov/feedback/contact.html> (developing
policy guidelines for CalSTRS’ involvement in securities litigation).
57. A number of institutions have conducted active searches, selected litigation counsel in their ca-
pacity as lead plaintiff, and negotiated fee agreements designed to reduce litigation costs and minimize
agency costs.  See, e.g., In re Waste Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. H99-2183 (S.D. Tex. May 8,
2000), at 44 (citing affidavit submitted by Connecticut describing its negotiation of a fee schedule with
proposed lead counsel providing for lower fees than those typically awarded in securities fraud class
actions); Daniel Wise, Big Apple, Empire State vie to Control Stock Suit, NAT’L L.J., July 19, 1999, at
A5 [hereinafter Wise, Big Apple] (quoting assistant corporation counsel Hilary Klein as stating that the
city’s fee agreement with its counsel in McKesson case provides for fees of less than 10% of the recov-
ery); Daniel Wise, NYC Moves to Slash Cendant Fees, 222 LEGAL INTELLIG. 4, 4 (2000) [hereinafter
Wise, NYC Moves to Slash Cendant Fees] (describing retainer agreement between the three lead plain-
tiff pension funds and their counsel in the Cendant case); Keith L. Johnson & Richard H. Koppes, Cell-
star and Cal Micro Cases Provide New Model for Securities Fraud Litigation, 1999 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INST., Oct. 7, 1999, at 537, 542 (describing success of State of Wisconsin
Investment Board in negotiating a competitive fee agreement in Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp.
542 (N.D. Tex. 1997)); Kansas Public Employees Retirement System Search for Outside Securities Liti-
gation Counsel/Request for Proposals (June 1999) (on file with author).
58. In Cendant, for example, in which three public pension funds served as lead plaintiff, the case
was resolved by a $3.1 billion settlement.  See Wise, NYC Moves to Slash Cendant Fees, supra note 57,
at 4.
59. If questions about the form and type of notice result in collateral litigation, they can further
extend this waiting period.  For example, the court in Lucent, after rejecting what was essentially the
standard form and medium for notice, ordered publication of a revised notice.  See In re Lucent Tech-
nologies, Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 148 (D.N.J. 2000).  The court then appointed a provisional
lead plaintiff, pending receipt of motions from other interested class members.  See id. at 154-55.
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provision is exacerbated if the court uses an auction process to select lead coun-
sel, as described below.60  Moreover, the subsequent step in litigation under the
PSLRA is virtually always a motion to dismiss by the defendant,61 and, under
the statute, the defendant is entitled to a stay of discovery pending resolution of
the motion.62
These factors, in combination, can result in substantial delay.  The record in
Network Associates illustrates the extent to which litigation over the lead plain-
tiff provision can delay a case.  The first complaint in the case was filed on April
7, 1999.63  The court was not successful in appointing a lead plaintiff until De-
cember 15, 1999;64 lead counsel was not appointed until January 24, 2000;65 and
the case was subsequently stayed by the Ninth Circuit while it reviewed writ re-
quests challenging those decisions until March 27, 2000.66  Thus, after almost an
entire year of litigation, the defendants had not even responded to the com-
plaint.67
The statute grants the lead plaintiff authority to select class counsel; ac-
cordingly, the selection of lead plaintiff is generally linked to the appointment
of lead counsel.68  Plaintiffs’ firms appreciate this linkage and recognize that rep-
resentation of the lead plaintiff is the new ticket to the courthouse.  Conse-
quently, firms are developing a variety of methods for identifying and recruiting
clients to serve as lead plaintiffs, with the expectation that if the firm’s client is
appointed lead plaintiff, the firm’s appointment as lead counsel will follow.69
Firms have approached the challenge of securing lead counsel appointments
in a variety of ways.  One approach is to assemble a large group of investors,
60. See infra Part IV.
61. See, e.g., Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State
Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 665 (1997) (explaining that plaintiffs’ attorneys can expect at least one
and possibly several motions to dismiss); see also Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery
Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act
Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537 (1998) (describing motions to dismiss under the PSLRA); Elliott J.
Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIZ. L.
REV. 675 (1996) (same).
62. See, e.g., Walker et al., supra note 61, at 665 (describing the new discovery stay as “an added
incentive for a motion to dismiss”).
63. See In re Network Assocs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
64. See Order Supporting Robert A. Vatuone as Lead Plaintiff, Dec. 15, 1999, In re Network As-
socs., Inc., Sec. Litig. 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (No. C99-01729), available at (visited Mar.
24, 2001) <http:// securities.stanford.edu/decisions/neta/ 99cv01729/189.html>.
65. See Order Appointing Class Counsel, Jan. 24, 2000, Network Assocs, (No. C99-01729), available
at (visited Mar. 24, 2002) <http://securities.stanford.edu/decisions/neta/99cv01729/ 000124or.html>.
66. See 9th Cir. Lifts Stay in Network Associates Lead Plaintiff Decision, supra note 7, at 11 (de-
scribing decision by Ninth Circuit refusing to review the decision and lifting the previously ordered
stay).
67. See Order Appointing Class Counsel, supra note 65 (ordering lead plaintiff to file a first
amended complaint and ordering defendants to respond).  This order was stayed pending resolution of
the writ requests.  See 9th Cir. First to Address Class Representative, Counsel Selection Under PSLRA,
PENSION FUND. LITIG. REP., Apr. 24, 2000, at 4 (explaining procedural history of case).
68. But see infra note 269 and accompanying text.
69. See Walker et al., supra note 61, at 657 (describing how plaintiffs’ firms are using the statutorily
required notice to recruit investors as additional members of a would-be lead plaintiff group).
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which the firm proposes in the aggregate as a candidate for lead plaintiff.70  If
the court accepts the premise that a group of unrelated investors can serve as
lead plaintiff and that the holdings of individual group members should be ag-
gregated for the purpose of calculating the group’s financial interest, then a firm
can secure appointment as lead counsel by virtue of creating the largest lead
plaintiff group.  Part III below considers judicial responses to such aggregation
strategies and the consistency of this approach with the PSLRA.
Competition for lead counsel appointments has led to contentiousness.
Firms have debated the propriety of aggregation71 and have challenged the
qualifications of competing lead plaintiff applicants.72  In some cases, the compe-
tition has deteriorated into mudslinging and attacks on the character of com-
peting lead plaintiff applicants73 and their counsel.74  As a result, some courts
have been reluctant to defer to the lead plaintiff’s choice of counsel.  Moreover,
the PSLRA provides relatively little guidance on these issues.  The statute nei-
ther supplies the court with criteria for reviewing the lead plaintiff’s choice of
counsel nor explains the consequences if the court, pursuant to its statutory
authority, rejects the plaintiff’s selection.  In addition, the statute does not ex-
plicitly disturb the court’s traditional authority over the award of attorneys’
fees.
70. An alternative approach is to develop ongoing relationships with institutional investors.  It is
relatively easy to identify institutions that have sufficient investment holdings to qualify as lead plain-
tiffs and that might be willing to serve.  A law firm that cultivates such an institution as a client faces a
substantial likelihood of being appointed lead counsel on a regular basis.  Although institutions may
differ from the potential plaintiff lists maintained by plaintiff firms prior to the PSLRA, see Weiss &
Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2061 n.35, they serve a similar function in providing the attorney with ac-
cess to the lead counsel position.  As I observed in an earlier article, the PSLRA creates a potentially
lucrative role as institutional counsel of choice, but it raises new issues about the manner in which insti-
tutions exercise that choice.  See Fisch, supra note 44, at 548-50.
71. See, e.g., In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 809-11 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (describing
debate among competing lead plaintiff applicants as to the propriety of appointing a group of unrelated
investors and aggregating their holdings).
72. See, e.g., In re McKesson HBOC, Inc., Sec. Litig., 97 F. Supp. 2d 993, 995 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (de-
scribing competing claims by New York City and New York State of the largest financial interest in the
litigation); Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 817 (explaining objections by competing group to the appointment
of Florida State Board of Administration because the FSBA had already served as lead plaintiff in five
cases within the past three years and because it was subject to unique defenses); In re Advanced Tissue
Sciences Sec. Litig., 184 F.R.D. 346, 350 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (recounting dispute by competing groups over
the amount of their respective losses and over the weight that should be given to this factor).
73. See, e.g., In re Waste Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. H99-2183 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2000), at 41
(describing allegation by WMPG Group that the Treasurer of the State of Connecticut is too busy to
monitor the litigation because she is occupied with the investigation of her predecessor who pled guilty
to federal racketeering charges).
74. See, e.g., NALPG’s Opposition to Weiss & Yourman Motion and Vatuone Motion for Ap-
pointment of Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel Pursuant to Section 21D(A)(3)(B) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Oct. 14, 1999, In re Network Assocs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (No. 99-1729) [hereinafter NAPLG Opposition in Network Assocs.) (describing Weiss &
Yourman’s behavior in recruiting investors as felonious, duplicitous, and unethical); In re Cendant
Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 148-49 (D.N.J. 1998) (recounting “pay-to-play” allegations charging coun-
sel to CalPERS with making substantial contributions to the campaign of the New York State Comp-
troller); Paul Elias, Lead Counsel Battle Doesn’t Impress Ware, RECORDER, Sept. 7, 1999, at 4 (de-
scribing unsuccessful motion to disqualify Milberg Weiss from serving as co-lead counsel in In re 3Com
Sec. Litig. based on allegations of a conflict of interest).
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Consequently, several judges have severed the link between the appoint-
ments of lead plaintiff and lead counsel by taking over the selection of lead
counsel.75  Using variations on a process first employed by Judge Vaughn
Walker in the Oracle case,76 these judges have conducted sealed bid auctions for
the purpose of determining lead counsel.  Part IV below considers the implica-
tions of this procedure.
III
LEAD PLAINTIFF GROUPS AND AGGREGATION
A. The Appointment of Multiple Investors
The statutory basis for the appointment of a lead plaintiff group is section
21D(3)(B)(iii) of the PSLRA, which contains the only use of the term “group.”77
In the section dealing with the appointment of the “most adequate plaintiff,”
the statute instructs the court to “adopt a presumption that the most adequate
plaintiff . . . is the person or group of persons . . . that has the largest financial
interest in the relief sought by the class . . . .”78  The propriety of aggregation
thus depends on the interpretation of the term “group.”
Courts have taken three approaches.  Some courts have interpreted the term
“group” broadly to permit the appointment of large groups of unrelated inves-
tors as lead plaintiff.79  Several courts have adopted a narrow view in which a
lead plaintiff must either be a single investor or a closely-knit group.80  Most
courts have opted for the middle ground.  Following the SEC’s rule of reason,
these courts have accepted aggregation, but appointed groups that are limited
75. See, e.g., In re Lucent Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137 (D.N.J. 2000) (ordering lead
counsel auction); Sherleigh Assocs. LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688 (S.D.
Fla. 1999) (ordering selection of counsel through sealed bid auction procedure); Wenderhold v. Cylink
Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (selecting counsel on the basis of submitted bids).
76. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Cal. 1991), 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990),
131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (Supp. IV 1998) provides that the court
shall adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under
this chapter is the person or group of persons that–
(aa) has either filed the complaint or made a motion in response to a notice under sub-
paragraph (A)(i);
(bb) in the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest in the relief
sought by the class; and
(cc) otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.
Id. (emphasis added).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (ex-
plaining that many courts have adopted this broad approach under which “any conglomeration [of in-
vestors] will do”).
80. See id. at 1153-54 (adopting narrow view of group); Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d
845, 854 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (rejecting aggregation in favor of appointing a single investor as lead plaintiff).
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in size.81  Notably, in addition to their disagreement over the propriety of aggre-
gation, courts also disagree on the current state of the law.  For example, the
court in Network Associates stated in November 1999 that no court has desig-
nated a large aggregation of unrelated investors as lead plaintiff.82  In January
2000, the First Union court reached the opposite conclusion, stating that the
“overwhelming weight of authority” allowed the appointment of a large, unre-
lated group.83
Courts employing the broad approach have relied on the statutory language
that, in addition to authorizing the appointment of a lead plaintiff group, con-
tains no qualifying language or limitations on group size.84  Many early cases in-
volved a single unchallenged application for the appointment of a lead plaintiff
group.85  In addition, the appointment of a group frequently eliminated competi-
tion for the lead plaintiff appointment.86  In Vesta,87 for example, the court
claimed that it was unable to resolve the competing motions on the merits and
would select the lead plaintiff by tossing a coin.88  Motivated by this threat, the
competing groups resolved the matter through a stipulation seeking a joint ap-
pointment.89
81. See, e.g., In re Ribozyme Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Sec. Litig., 192 F.R.D. 656, 662 (D. Colo. 2000)
(appointing lead plaintiff group of four investors); In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206 (D.N.J.
1999) (appointing group of five investors); In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 217 (D.D.C. 1999)
(appointing triumvirate of investors); City Nominees v. Macromedia, No. C97-3521-SC, slip op. at 2, 6-7
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1998) (refusing to appoint group of 36 investors but accepting alternative proposal
of six persons as a “permissible, but suboptimal, result”).
82. See In re Network Assocs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“The
decisions have flat-out refused to appoint ‘large amalgamations of unrelated persons as lead plaintiff.’”)
(quoting In re Advanced Tissue Sciences Sec. Litig., 184 F.R.D. 346, 352 (S.D. Cal. 1998)).
83. In re First Union Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 3:99CV237-MCK, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2267, at *12
(W.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 2000).
84. See, e.g., D’Hondt v. Digi Int’l, Inc., No. 97-5 (JRT/RLE), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17700, at *13
(D. Minn. Apr. 3, 1997) (“[A]n arbitrary limit on the number of proposed Lead Plaintiffs would be un-
realistic if not wholly counterproductive.”); In re Cephalon Sec. Litig., No. 96-CV-0633, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13492, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1996) (“[T]he Act does not preclude appointing more than one
lead plaintiff,” and, as a result, “plaintiffs’ motion requesting the appointment of several lead plaintiffs
does not violate the Act”).
85. See First Union, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2267, at *9-10 (citing long list of cases in which court
appointed lead plaintiff groups ranging in size from 10 to 30 investors).
86. See, e.g., Stipulated Order Appointing Lead Plaintiff and Approving Co-Lead Counsel, Nov.
10, 1998, LaPerriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., No. CV-98-AR-1407-S (N.D. Ala. Oct. 19, 1998) (ac-
cepting stipulation seeking co-lead plaintiff appointment by preciously competing movants); Nager v.
Websecure, Inc., No. 97-10662-GAO, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19601, at *3, (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 1997)
(appointing group of 10 lead plaintiffs and three lead counsel from five previously filed complaints);
Zuckerman v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., No. 3:96-CV-2258-T, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23549, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 28, 1997) (granting joint motion by group comprised of formerly competing movants over the
objection of the defendant); see First Union, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2267 (accepting stipulation resolv-
ing competing motions for lead plaintiff by proposing appointment of both groups as co-lead plaintiffs).
87. LaPerriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, No. CV-98-AR-1407-S (N.D. Ala. 1998).
88. Order, Oct. 19, 1998, LaPerriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, No. CV-98-AR-1407-S (N.D. Ala. 1998).
89. See Peter M. Saparoff & Adam L. Sisitsky, The Role of Institutional Investors in Class Actions
Under the PSLRA–Are They Walking on a Slippery Slope?  Two Years Later, A.L.I.-A.B.A. SEC.
LITIG.: PLANNING & STRATEGIES, Apr. 30, 1999, at 919, 924-25 (describing Vesta litigation); see also
Memorandum of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, LaPerriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., No. CV-98-AR-1407-S
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A few courts have also based their acceptance of aggregation on the benefits
of a lead plaintiff group relative to the appointment of a single investor.90  The
Oxford court’s decision contains the most extensive discussion on this point.91
The court reasoned that a lead plaintiff group would provide a number of bene-
fits, including pooled knowledge and resources, joint decisionmaking, and joint
funding.  Similarly, a group combining individual and institutional investors can
address concerns about the representativeness of the lead plaintiff.92
The possibility that a court will allow aggregation without limit or, in the al-
ternative, appoint a subgroup from the largest lead plaintiff group, has led some
plaintiffs’ firms to attempt to secure the lead counsel appointment by obtaining
the largest portfolio of plaintiffs.  Firms have assembled hundreds or even thou-
sands of investors into lead plaintiff groups.  The court in Network Associates
faced two competing groups, one consisting of more than 1725 investors and the
other consisting of “over 100 institutions and thousands of individuals.”93  Forms
submitted by investors indicating their willingness to serve as lead plaintiffs
were collected by counsel, bundled into “numerous thick booklets,” and sub-
mitted to the court in “heavy boxes.”94  Similarly, the court in McKesson faced
motions from groups that included as many as 4000 investors.95
In more recent decisions, courts have been reluctant to accept the appoint-
ment of a large lead plaintiff group, reasoning that a large group cannot func-
tion effectively.96   In many cases, however, the court chooses the lead plaintiff
and its counsel on the basis of the larger group’s holdings and then limits its ap-
pointment to a smaller group or subgroup.97  If the court bases its selection on
overall aggregate holdings, it creates an incentive for counsel to assemble large
portfolios of unrelated investors.98
A combination of distaste for the competition to create and manipulate lead
plaintiff groups and skepticism over the ability of such groups to function effec-
tively has led several courts to reject aggregation altogether.  Under the nar-
rowest reading of the statute, these courts have reasoned that the use of a group
(N.D. Ala. 1998) [hereinafter Vesta Amicus Brief] (arguing against the appointment of co-lead plain-
tiffs), available at (visited March 26, 2001) <http://www.sec.gov/news/legal/vestabrf.txt>.
90. See, e.g., D’Hont v. Digi Int’l, Inc., No. 97-5 (JRT/RLE), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17700, at *13
(D. Minn. Apr. 3, 1997) (“[W]hen more greatly numbered, the Lead Plaintiffs can more effectively
withstand any supposed effort by the class counsel to seize control of the class claims.”).
91. See In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig, 182 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
92. See Yousefi v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1070-71 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“[With]
the appointment of one lead plaintiff who is an individual private investor and one lead plaintiff that is
an institutional investor, the lead plaintiffs will represent a broader range of shareholder interests than
if the Court appointed an individual or an institutional investor alone.”).
 93. In re Network Assocs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
94. Id. at 1022.
95. See Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
96. See, e.g., Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 853 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (explaining that
a large group of unrelated investors could not effectively manage the litigation and oversee class coun-
sel).
97. See id. at 851 (describing and criticizing this process); Network Assocs., 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1023-
24 (same).
98. See Brightpoint, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 851-52.
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is justified only by special circumstances and that ordinarily the appointment of
a single investor is preferable.  In one of the first decisions to take this ap-
proach, Judge Cederbaum observed in Donkenny99 that allowing lawyers to
designate unrelated plaintiffs as a group would allow and encourage lawyers to
direct the litigation.  Refusing to accept multiple lead plaintiffs, the judge chose
a single institutional investor.100 Similarly, the court in Wenderhold v. Cylink
Corp.101 explained that plaintiff groups are appropriate only in rare circum-
stances, such as when they are necessary to address multiple class periods or
when appointing a group increases client control over the lawyers.102  Accord-
ingly, the court appointed a single individual as lead plaintiff.  More recently,
the court in Network Associates criticized the use of either a large lead plaintiff
group or a smaller subgroup and concluded that a single candidate should be
chosen over an artificially aggregated group of investors.103
The vast majority of decisions have taken a middle position, permitting the
appointment of a group of unrelated investors but limiting the group to a “rea-
sonable” size.104  This is consistent with the position of the SEC.105 Although it
has taken the position that large lead plaintiff groups reduce client control and
are contrary to the purpose of the statute, the SEC has not argued that either
aggregation or the use of lead plaintiff groups is improper.106  Instead, the SEC
suggests that courts scrutinize the ability of group members to monitor and
work together and advocates judicial paring down of groups to the minimum
size needed.107  According to the SEC, courts should ordinarily limit group size
to three to five members.108
A few courts have resolved concerns about competition or representative-
ness through the use of multiple or co-lead plaintiffs.  Although the terminology
used by courts varies, co-lead plaintiffs are generally unrelated plaintiffs initially
in competition for the lead plaintiff position.109  A court may appoint more than
99. In re Donkenny, Inc., Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
 100. See id. at 158.
101. 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
102. See id. at 586.
103. In re Network Assocs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1027-31 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
104. See supra note 81 (citing cases).  Some courts have termed this a “rule of reason.”  See, e.g., In
re Lucent Techs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 154 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189
F.R.D. 91, 112 (D.N.J. 1999); Chill v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 181 F.R.D. 398, 409 (D. Minn. 1998).
105. See, e.g., Memorandum of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, Switzenbaum v. Orbital Sciences Corp.,
187 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Va. 1999) (No. 99-197-A), available at (visited Mar. 21, 2001)
<http://www.sec.gov/ news/legal/orbital.htm> (arguing that court should limit proposed lead plaintiff
group to a small number capable of managing the litigation, generally three to five investors); Memo-
randum of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 218 (D.D.C. 1999) (No.
A.98-2465 (JHG)) [hereinafter Baan Amicus Brief] (same); see also Memorandum of the SEC, Amicus
Curiae, In re Network Assocs. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1035, 1052-53 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (No. 99-
01729 (WHA)) [hereinafter Network Amicus Brief] (summarizing the SEC’s position on aggregation).
106. See Network Amicus Brief, supra note 105.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. The SEC has taken the position that competing movants should not be appointed as co-lead
plaintiffs, arguing that such appointments interfere with the lead plaintiff’s ability to negotiate retention
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one competing plaintiff as a compromise or to address concerns about the ade-
quacy or typicality of a prospective lead plaintiff.  Thus, for example, the Vesta
court appointed two groups as co-lead plaintiffs pursuant to a stipulation.110  The
court in Oxford appointed three sets of investors, including individuals and in-
stitutions, as co-lead plaintiffs.111  Each co-lead plaintiff in Oxford was repre-
sented by separate counsel,112 and each was given one vote on litigation deci-
sions.113  Finally, the court in Yousefi appointed the two largest investors, an
individual and an institution, as co-lead plaintiffs.114  The court noted approv-
ingly that “with the appointment of one lead plaintiff who is an individual pri-
vate investor and one lead plaintiff that is an institutional investor, the lead
plaintiffs will represent a broader range of shareholder interests than if the
Court appointed an individual or an institutional investor alone.”115
B. Aggregation and the PSLRA
The widespread acceptance of aggregation is troubling.  Contrary to the ar-
guments made in some cases, the text of the statute does not require courts to
appoint lead plaintiff groups of unrelated investors.  Aggregation is inconsistent
with the client empowerment objective of the PSLRA and is unsupported by
the legislative history.  Aggregation is also unsound from a policy perspective.
Judicial endorsement of lead plaintiff groups, even those of “reasonable” size,
raises a host of implementation issues that transform the appointment process
from a relatively objective inquiry into a discretionary inquiry subject to exces-
sive lawyer control, unwarranted judicial intervention, or both.
To accept aggregation, courts must accept two distinct premises.  First, they
must conclude that the statute permits the lead plaintiff to consist of a group of
unrelated investors.  Second, courts must conclude that the financial interests of
the individual group members should be aggregated in determining the finan-
cial interest of the group.
With respect to the first point, courts have based the conclusion that they
are authorized to appoint lead plaintiff groups on a single inclusion of the term
“group” in the statute.116  It is a mistake, however, to conclude that the appear-
ance of the term mandates, or even permits, the appointment of large groups of
unrelated investors.  Rather, the PSLRA overwhelmingly refers to the lead
agreements and to monitor the effectiveness of counsel.  See Vesta Amicus Brief, supra note 89 (argu-
ing “that the Court should not appoint competing applicants as co-lead plaintiffs”).
110. See Stipulated Order Appointing Lead Plaintiff and Approving Co-Lead Counsel, Nov. 10,
1998, LaPerriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., No. CV-98-AR-1407-S (N.D. Ala. 1998) (accepting stipula-
tion seeking co-lead plaintiff appointment by previously competing movants).
111. See In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
112. See id. at 50.
113. See id. at 45.
114. See Yousefi v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
115. Id. at 1071; see also Laborers Local 1298 Pension Fund v. Campbell Soup Co., [2000 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,963, at 94,221 (D.N.J. May 17, 2000) (defending institution and
two individuals on the basis that “each may bring a unique perspective to the litigation”).
116. See supra note 77.
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plaintiff in the singular, and the single use of the term “group” is something of
an anomaly.117  Nor is it clear from the statutory text or structure what the term
means.  As the Telxon court observed, several dictionary definitions suggest
that “group” should be read narrowly to encompass investors who share a
meaningful relationship independent of the litigation, such as members of a
partnership or mutual funds under common management.118
Even assuming that the statutory text permits the appointment of a lead
plaintiff group, the statute does not instruct courts as to the appropriate calcula-
tion of the group’s financial interest.119  Although several courts have concluded
that it is appropriate to calculate the group’s interest by adding together the fi-
nancial interest of each group member,120 this conclusion is generally unsup-
ported by careful analysis.121  A number of alternative methodologies are possi-
ble, including selecting either the group with the largest individual loss within
the group or the group with the largest average loss by its members.  Adoption
of either of these approaches would substantially reduce the  frequency with
which a group is appointed lead plaintiff.122  Moreover, no general principle of
federal law supports the propriety of aggregation.  Indeed, there is authority to
117. See, e.g., In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 404, 417 (D.N.J. 1998) (“Significantly,
apart from the sole reference to ‘a group of persons,’ the PSLRA is worded in the singular, providing a
mechanism for the appointment of ‘the most adequate plaintiff,’ not the most adequate plaintiffs.”);
accord In re Lucent Techs. Inc., Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 154 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Telxon Corp. Sec.
Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 812 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
118. See Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 813 (distinguishing such a group from a “melange”); see also Sak-
hrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (describing counsel-created aggre-
gates as “artificial” groups).  Elliott Weiss, whose scholarship provided the model for the lead plaintiff
provision, has stated publicly that the term “group” was added to the statute to clarify the authority of a
court to treat affiliated mutual funds as a single investor for the purpose of the statute.  See Elliott
Weiss, Remarks at Conference on Complex Litigation, Institute for Law & Economic Policy (Apr. 14,
2000); see also In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 224 n.12 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing Weiss & Beck-
erman, supra note 16, as suggesting that Congress used the “group” language to encompass associated
institutions such as different funds from the same mutual fund group which were technically separate
legal entities).
119. Indeed, the courts have had to develop a general test for calculating the size of an investor’s
financial interest under the statute.  See In re Olsten Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F. Supp. 2d 286, 295 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (articulating four factor test including: “(1) the number of shares purchased during the class pe-
riod; (2) the number of net shares purchased during the class period; (3) the total net funds expended
during the class period; and (4) the approximate losses suffered during the class period”).
120. See, e.g., In re Informix Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-97-1289-SBA, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23687
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 1997) (reasoning that, under the plain meaning of the statute, the group with the
largest aggregate loss had the largest financial interest); Order Appointing Lead Plaintiffs, In re Ride,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C97-402 WD, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23689, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 5, 1997),
(finding that “it is clear that the ‘financial interest’ of plaintiffs aligned together should be computed by
aggregating their claims”).
121. See, e.g., Brightpoint, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 851 (criticizing prior courts’ failure to analyze method of
aggregating group losses).
122. For example, the court in Ride rejected the appointment of group of two investors, one of
whom had purchased 36,024 shares and suffered the largest individual loss of any lead plaintiff appli-
cant, in favor of a group of 17 investors in which the largest individual purchase was 9000 shares.  See
Ride, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23689.  Similarly, in In re Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., Sec. Litig.,
No. C97-402WD 1997, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23691 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 1997), the court, without analysis,
appointed a seven-member group rather than one individual who had suffered a greater loss than any
single member of the group.
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the contrary; “well-settled” principles of federal law prohibit class members
from aggregating their claims for the purpose of meeting the amount-in-
controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction.123
To the extent that the statute fails to provide clear guidelines for courts in
determining what constitutes a proper lead plaintiff group, it is appropriate to
consider the statutory objectives.124  The PSLRA was designed to “‘minimize
costs’ and to ‘give control of the litigation to lead plaintiffs with substantial
holdings to the securities of the issuer.’”125  The purpose of the lead plaintiff
provision is to reduce the collective action problems and agency costs that frus-
trate class management.126  The statute attempts to achieve these objectives by
vesting authority for overseeing the litigation in an investor with a sufficient
stake to monitor it effectively.  This purpose is apparent from numerous ele-
ments of the statutory design.127
A collection of unrelated individuals cannot effectively exercise client con-
trol.  Group decisionmaking is, by its very nature, less efficient than individual
decisionmaking.128  Group members face obstacles in coordination, sharing in-
formation, and acting collectively.129  Dispersing authority among group mem-
bers creates a variety of collective action problems, including the possibilities of
free-riding,130 cycling,131 and strategic behavior.132
These problems increase when the court appoints a lead plaintiff group con-
sisting of group members with relatively small stakes.  Although the group may
have a large financial interest in the aggregate, the small individual stakes re-
duce the likelihood that group members will participate actively in the litigation
123. See, e.g., Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d Cir. 1993) (“It is well-settled
that in a diversity-based class action, members of the class may not aggregate their claims in order to
reach the requisite amount in controversy.”); accord Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973).
124. Indeed, the statute itself directs courts to consider its purposes.  See Aronson v. McKesson
HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
125. Greenberg v. Bear Stearns & Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d 65, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), citing CONF. REP.,
supra note 19.
126. See, e.g., In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 814 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
127. See id. at 815 (detailing elements of statutory structure that reflect congressional desire to re-
duce agency costs and collective action problems and explaining that these concerns “permeate[] the
statute” and are “apparent without resort to the legislative history”).
128. See generally R. Chris Heck, Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional In-
vestors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1219-21 (1999) (describing
inefficiencies associated with decisionmaking by aggregate lead plaintiff group).
129. See id.
130. See, e.g., IAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION 11-12 (1987) (explaining free-
riding problem as one in which group members are able to obtain a benefit (or avoid a cost) without
paying for it).  Increases in group size generally lead to an increase in free-riding.  See MANCUR
OLSON,  JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE  ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 48
(1965).
131. See, e.g., KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951) (identifying
risk that voting cycling will interfere with the selection of the outcome enjoying the greatest support).
132. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112
HARV. L. REV. 483, 542-44 (1998) (describing various forms of strategic behavior).
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process.133  As the court explained in Zaltzman v. Manugistics Group, Inc.,134 the
likely result is a conglomeration of individuals who, because their “personal
stakes in the outcome are smaller,” lack the “incentive for zealous participation
and interaction with class counsel.”135
In the context of securities litigation, the appointment of a lead plaintiff
group effectively transfers control from the investor to the lawyer.  In virtually
all cases, lawyers are responsible for assembling and managing lead plaintiff
groups.  Lawyers control group formation, choosing which investors to propose
as group members and manipulating group membership at will.136  This enables
lawyers to select for any combination of client characteristics, including passiv-
ity.137  Even where the court participates in the selection of group members, fur-
ther management of the lead plaintiff group is left to the direction of the law-
yers, who decide when to consult with the group, what information to provide,
and so forth.138  This structure provides little potential for client monitoring.  In-
deed, in at least one reported case, an investor was not even advised that he was
a member of the lead plaintiff group.139
Aggregation also undermines the most significant aspect of the lead plaintiff
position: the authority to select and retain lead counsel.140  This authority is cen-
tral to the lead plaintiff’s ability to monitor the litigation.  The PSLRA enables
the lead plaintiff to monitor its lawyers by (1) reviewing lawyer qualifications
and selecting appropriate counsel; (2) negotiating a fee structure that reduces
133. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 8, at 68 (explaining how higher per capita stakes increase like-
lihood that group members will participate effectively).
134. No. S-98-1881, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22867 (D. Md. Oct. 8, 1998).
135. Id. at *14-15 (explaining how the appointment of such a group “subverts” the statutory purpose
of active involvement and attorney oversight).
136. See, e.g., In re Waste Management, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. H99-2183, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9370,
at *41-42 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2000) (describing criticism of WMPG group for proposing alternatively a
group of 660 members, a 12-member “institutional group” and 11-member steering committee or a
three-member executive committee); id. at 52-53 (recounting contention that conglomeration of law
firms was responsible for selecting proposed subgroups); Switzenbaum v. Orbital Sciences Corp., 187
F.R.D. 246, 250-51 (E.D. Va. 1999) (describing variable formulations of proposed lead plaintiff group,
including attempts “to bootstrap members in and out of its leadership”).
137. See Yousefi v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(“[P]ermitting the group and its counsel to name representative lead plaintiffs would allow counsel to
name nominally interested plaintiffs as a means of seizing control of the suit.”).
138. Moreover, because the statute provides no basis for allocating group decisionmaking authority,
group members are, as a practical matter, hampered from exercising active oversight.  Are litigation
decisions subject to majority vote?  Does each member have one vote or are voting rights based on
each investor’s financial interest?  How does the group resolve a deadlock?  If group members have
different preferences, do they vote, defer to counsel, or appeal to the court?  Investors without a pre-
existing relationship are unlikely to resolve these issues, which effectively leaves decisionmaking in the
control of plaintiffs’ counsel.
139. See Amicus Brief of SEC at 3, Parnes v.  Digital Lightwave, Inc., No. 99-11293 (11th Cir. Aug.
25, 1999), available at (visited Mar. 24, 2001) <http://securities.stanford.edu/briefs/digl/9911293
/990825sec.html> (explaining that one member of the lead plaintiff group “was not even apprised that
he had been named as a group member until well after a settlement in the case was agreed to and sub-
mitted to the court for approval”).
140. See, e.g., Gluck v. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 550 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (describing provision
authorizing lead plaintiff to select counsel as “a critical part of Congress’s effort to transfer control of
securities class actions from lawyers to investors”).
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agency costs and increases the lawyers’ incentives to act in the best interests of
the plaintiff class; and (3) continuing to supervise lawyer decisions throughout
the litigation.  A court that appoints a lead plaintiff group, however, effectively
appoints the lawyer representing that group and authorizes the lawyer to select
the group members.  This result defeats the purpose of the PSLRA that the cli-
ent choose counsel instead of counsel choosing the client.141
Moreover, reading the statutory text to require aggregation leads to an ab-
surd result.  Because the statute contains no limitations on the term “group,” it
provides no express authority for courts to limit group size arbitrarily.142  Absent
such authority, however, the court would be unable to restrict groups of hun-
dreds or even thousands of members.  The statute would permit, or perhaps
even force, the court to appoint the group with the largest aggregate holdings,
regardless of size or number of members.  Indeed, the entire plaintiff class could
be joined into a single lead plaintiff group.143  To avoid such a result, judicial
authority to limit the use of lead plaintiff groups where necessary to achieve the
statutory objectives must be inferred.
The legislative history lends additional support to the argument that aggre-
gation is not appropriate.144  The Network Associates opinion carefully examines
the legislative history of the PSLRA and finds that all references to the lead
plaintiff are couched in the singular.145  There is no suggestion that the lead
plaintiff can consist of multiple investors or that Congress intended for the lead
plaintiff to be an amalgamation.  The House Conference report, for example,
makes at least twelve references to the lead plaintiff, all in the singular.146
The legislative history further demonstrates congressional concern with cli-
ent empowerment as a means to address the problems Congress identified with
lawyer-driven litigation.147  A key indication that Congress viewed a group or
committee as an inferior structure for monitoring plaintiffs’ counsel is reflected
141. See CONF. REP., supra note 19, at 6.
142. Cf. D’Hondt v. Digi Int’l Inc., No. 97-5 (JRT/RLE) 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17700, at *13 (D.
Minn. Apr. 3, 1997) (“[A]n arbitrary limit on the number of proposed Lead Plaintiffs would be unreal-
istic, if not wholly counterproductive.”).
143. See, e.g., Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 853 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (observing that
some of the proposed lead plaintiff groups are themselves large enough to satisfy the Rule 23 require-
ments for a class action).
144. Even Justice Scalia, the Court’s most ardent defender of textualism, permits the use of extrinsic
evidence when literal application of the statute would lead to an absurd result.  See Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing between the use
of legislative history in general and its use to avoid an absurd result); see also William D. Popkin, An
Internal Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1155-59
(1992).
145. See In re Network Assocs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“[N]o
reference whatsoever was made in the reports to multiple, unrelated individuals at the helm.”).
146. See CONF. REP., supra note 19, at 33-35.
147. See, e.g., Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (find-
ing narrow reading of group most “consistent with the legislative intent to increase client control over
plaintiff’s counsel”).
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in the evolution of the lead plaintiff provision from its statutory predecessors.148
The lead plaintiff group bears a strong resemblance to the plaintiff steering
committee, a concept that was proposed in earlier versions of the statute but ul-
timately rejected in the PSLRA.149  A plausible reason that Congress substituted
the lead plaintiff provision for the plaintiff steering committee is its concern that
the group decisionmaking required by the latter would prove ineffective.150
The legislative history also reveals that Congress was particularly interested
in encouraging institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiffs.151 Congress
viewed institutional investors as having greater sophistication and ability to
monitor as well as the substantial stakes that would make monitoring rational.152
The legislative history explains that the statutory presumption in favor of the
investor with the largest interest in the case was designed to increase the likeli-
hood that institutional investors would serve as lead plaintiffs.153  The use of lead
plaintiff groups is inconsistent with this statutory objective.  As the cases dem-
onstrate, it is possible to create a sufficiently large group of individual investors
such that the group’s holdings, if aggregated, would exceed those of any institu-
tion.154  Judicial acceptance of these groups thus reduces the likelihood that an
institutional investor will be appointed as lead plaintiff.
It is also undesirable as a matter of policy for courts to accept aggregation
and appoint large lead plaintiff groups.155  First, as indicated above, the possibil-
ity of aggregation creates undesirable incentives for would-be lead counsel.
148. Courts interpreting the lead plaintiff provision have paid surprisingly little attention to this
evolution.
149. See, e.g., S. 240, 104th Cong., §§ 101(c), 103 (1995) (requiring appointment of guardian ad litem
and steering committee for the plaintiff class); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., § 202(a) (1995) (providing for
plaintiff steering committees); See also Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities
Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1528-29 (1996) (proposing plaintiff’s steering committees to “su-
pervise class counsel and make those litigation and settlement decisions traditionally reserved to the
client,” on which institutional investors that opt into the class action would be required to participate).
150. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Reform: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Telecommunica-
tions and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 142, 144
(1994) (testimony of Arthur Miller, Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School) [hereinafter
Testimony of Arthur Miller] (describing plaintiff steering committee as “a very big mistake” and a “god-
like Greek chorus”).
151. See, e.g., CONF. REP., supra note 19, at 34 (describing congressional desire to “encourage insti-
tutional investors to take a more active role in securities class action lawsuits”).  See generally Heck,
supra note 128, at 1204 (arguing that legislative history of the PSLRA shows that Congress intended it
to encourage institutional investors to become lead plaintiffs).
152. See In re Lucent Techs. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 151-52 (D.N.J. 2000) (describing congres-
sional goal of institutional investor monitoring).
153. See S. REP., supra note 45, at 11 (“The Committee intends to increase the likelihood that insti-
tutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs by requiring the court to presume that the member of the
purported class with the largest financial stake in the relief sought is the ‘most adequate plaintiff.’”).
154. See, e.g., In re Waste Management, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. H-99-2183 (MH), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9370, at *35 (S.D. Tex. May 8, 2000) (describing a motion by the Waste Management Plaintiffs
Group, consisting of 660 individual investors, which claimed a larger aggregate loss than any other
movant, including the State of Connecticut).
155. See Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for
Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1312 (1999) (arguing that courts should consider leg-
islative purpose and policy considerations in interpreting the federal securities laws).
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The efforts of some firms to create massive lead plaintiff groups to secure the
lead counsel appointment are not socially productive.156  Most controversial is
the practice employed by Weiss & Yourman of paying the expenses of broker-
age houses to send material to investors about pending lawsuits.157  The practice
has been challenged as improper client solicitation, as well as inconsistent with
the PSLRA.158  Whether or not it is technically legal, it raises serious ethical
concerns.  Courts have not restricted the practice yet, however, and Weiss &
Yourman has used it successfully to recruit investors to join its lead plaintiff
groups.159
The SEC argued in Network Associates that the solicitation practice could
have the beneficial effect of providing investors with notice of a pending action
and the opportunity to seek appointment as lead plaintiff.160  The claim that in-
vestor solicitation effectively informs investors is, at best, naïve.  An examina-
tion of the solicitation materials used in recent securities cases demonstrates
that they provide investors with little more than instructions on how to join the
lead plaintiff group.161  The solicitation materials include only limited informa-
tion about the litigation process and, many times, lead to investor confusion.162
In several cases, investors recanted and withdrew from lead plaintiff groups, ex-
plaining to the court that the material they received misled them.163  Rather than
156. See Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 851 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (criticizing aggrega-
tion for creating an incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to compete in assembling the largest lead plaintiff
group).
157. See, e.g., Paul Elias, Both Sides Attack Twist in Stock Cases, RECORDER, Sept. 8, 1999, at 1 (de-
scribing solicitation practices).
158. See Seamans v. Aid Auto Stores, Inc., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
90,902, at 93,806 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2000) (describing the argument by a competing firm that the lead
plaintiff motion should be denied because “it is tainted by the . . . attorneys’ improper attempt to solicit
individuals with enough shares to form a plaintiff group with the greatest financial stake in order to be
appointed lead plaintiff”); NAPLG Opposition in Network Associates, supra note 74, at 153 (describing
Weiss & Yourman’s mass mailings and reimbursement of broker mailing expenses as illegal and un-
ethical client solicitation); Elias, supra note 157 (describing challenges in Network Assocs. and Landry’s
cases).
159. See Elias, supra note 157 (describing finding by Network Assocs. court that practice was neither
illegal nor unethical and success of Weiss & Yourman in using the practice to recruit investors).
160. See Network Amicus Brief, supra note 105, at 1053-54.
161. For example, as a Waste Management shareholder, I received a copy of the solicitation materi-
als prepared by Weiss & Yourman.  The materials included a copy of the complaint, a one page letter,
and a certification form.  The letter stated that Weiss & Yourman represents the plaintiff and numerous
other shareholders, has significant experience, and has undertaken the litigation on a contingent fee
basis.  It instructed me to return the certification form if I wanted to join the group of lead plaintiffs.
The material did not state that I would remain as a member of the plaintiff class if I did not send in the
form.  The certification form did not indicate that, by completing the form, I was agreeing to retain
Weiss & Yourman as my attorney.  Finally, the material provided no details about the firm’s qualifica-
tions or the structure of the contingency fee.
162. See, e.g., Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 851 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (describing evi-
dence indicating that at least some investors who return the forms in response to these solicitations be-
lieve they are simply preserving their claims rather than volunteering to serve as lead plaintiff).
163. See, e.g., In re Network Assocs. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (de-
scribing how many of the investors who had supposedly agreed to join in a particular lead plaintiff
group “recanted and sent in declarations . . . explaining how they had been misled by the form”); In re
Waste Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. H-99-2183 (MH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9370, at *61-62 (S.D.
Tex. May 8, 2000) (stating that various investors, including an institutional investor claiming a loss of
FISCH_FMT.DOC 04/19/01  1:22 PM
76 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 64: Nos. 2&3
informing, investor solicitation seems to be having the effect of creating am-
biguous, uninformed, and even unauthorized representation relationships.164
Moreover, these effects are not limited to cases in which investors are solicited
through direct mailings.  As the Lucent court explained, some plaintiffs’ lawyers
have also converted the statutorily mandated notice into a marketing tool “de-
signed primarily to accumulate members of the class rather than to inform.”165
Second, aggregation, particularly in its most popular form, converts the se-
lection of the lead plaintiff from an objective process into an unwieldy and eas-
ily manipulated procedure.  The presumption in favor of the investor with the
largest financial interest provides an objective standard for the court and limits
the ability of counsel to control the selection of lead plaintiff.  Once the court
accepts the premise of a lead plaintiff group, however, it loses objectivity.  The
court must determine the appropriate group size.  The court must decide
whether to choose the group members independently or whether to appoint a
subgroup from a larger aggregation of investors.  The court also must consider
whether to become involved in reviewing individual group member qualifica-
tions or whether to leave that decision to class counsel.  And, finally, the court
must evaluate the propriety of selecting and substituting group members.
If the court defers to counsel with respect to the selection of group mem-
bers, it has effectively undermined the PSLRA’s efforts to reduce lawyer con-
trol of the litigation.166  As the court in Brightpoint recognized, decisions that
allow aggregation, and then select from competing subgroups assembled by
counsel, create the same agency and collective action problems that led Con-
gress to adopt the PSLRA.167  In addition, these decisions generate “a great deal
of truly useless activity . . . and controversy.”168
If, instead, the court actively evaluates the composition of the lead plaintiff
group,169 it initiates an arbitrary and wasteful process.170 Significantly, the
PSLRA instructs courts to select the lead plaintiff based on the size of its finan-
$17 million, withdrew lead plaintiff certification forms as “unauthorized and obtained by misleading
practices.”)
164. In addition, the adversarial process is poorly suited to uncover instances of investor confusion.
Because the ethical rules prohibit lawyers from communicating with a party represented by counsel, a
firm risks sanction if it attempts to verify the bona fides of the claimed representations.  See, e.g.,
Stearns v. Navigant Consulting, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2000) (warning the firm that
it had narrowly avoided being disqualified as lead counsel for contacting investors purportedly repre-
sented by a competing firm for the purpose of clarifying their consent to representation).
165. In re Lucent Techs. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 147 (D.N.J. 2000).
166. See, e.g., Schlagal v. Learning Tree Int’l., [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
90,435, at 91,968-72 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 1999) (citing decisions in which courts have left the designation
of a lead plaintiff subgroup to counsel).
167. See 78 F. Supp. 2d at 853.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., In re Nice Systems Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206 (D.N.J. 1999) (reducing the size of a
proffered nine-member group by eliminating four members whose interests were disproportionately
small).
170. The court is limited even in its ability to determine the appropriate group size.  See, e.g., Eric A.
Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions On Collective Action,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 139 n.12 (1996) (describing vast and complex literature on group cooperation).
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cial interest in the case.171  Thus, the statute expressly specifies the selection cri-
teria.172  A court that inquires into other lead plaintiff characteristics or imposes
additional qualifications is substituting its judgment for that of Congress.173
Moreover, expanding the scope of the inquiry creates inappropriate collateral
litigation.  Finally, the risk that the lead plaintiff will be subjected to intrusive
discovery or personal attack is likely to discourage investors, particularly insti-
tutional investors, from seeking to serve as lead plaintiffs.174
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that courts should read the
term “group” narrowly and refuse requests for aggregation.  Even the common
use of groups consisting of three to five unrelated investors is inconsistent with
the statutory objectives and is likely to undermine the effectiveness of the lead
plaintiff.  Instead, the foregoing analysis indicates that courts should accept
multiple investors as a lead plaintiff group only when those investors have a
pre-existing relationship independent of the litigation and function as a single
decisionmaking unit.  Families, partnerships, and multiple investment funds un-
der common management are examples of groups that fall within the statutory
language.175  Other than these narrowly defined groups, courts should appoint
only a single investor as lead plaintiffthe institution or individual with the
largest financial interest in the case.
The recent decision in Waste Management176 demonstrates why it was neces-
sary for Congress to include the term “group” in the statutory language and il-
lustrates how that term should be applied.  In that case, the State of Connecticut
sought lead plaintiff status on behalf of six state pension funds.177  Because the
funds were organized as independent legal entities, a competing lead plaintiff
objected to their treatment as a single legal entity under the PSLRA.178  The
court rejected this argument, finding that the funds were combined into a single
pool for investment purposes and were operated under the direction of a single
171. But see Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 783-84 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (ex-
plaining that insistence by the presumptive lead plaintiff that its preferred counsel handle the case
rather than the low bidder in the court’s sealed bid auction would rebut the presumption that plaintiff
was the “most adequate”).
172. See Baan Amicus Brief, supra note 105, at 228 (arguing that Congress rejected the objective of
fuller or more diverse representation in favor of the lead plaintiff with the largest financial interest).
173. See, e.g., Laborers Local 1298 Pension Fund v. Campbell Soup Co., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,963, at 94,220 n.5 (D.N.J. May 17, 2000) (considering the possibility that the
largest financial interest should be measured in relative rather than absolute terms).
174. See, e.g., Reply Memorandum of Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds in Support of
its Appointment as Lead Plaintiff, at 10-11, In re Waste Management, Inc. Sec. Litig. (No. H-99-2183
(MH) (S.D. Tex. 1999) (describing attacks against Connecticut and a similar occurrence in the Telxon
case).
175. See, e.g., Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1146 n.11 (N.D.Cal. 1999)
(finding that New York City Pension funds, although technically separate entities, were one person for
purposes of the PSLRA because they are under the jurisdiction of the New York City Comptroller’s
Office and represented by one in-house counsel, the New York Corporation Counsel).
176. In re Waste Management, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. H-99-2183 (MH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9370
(S.D. Tex. May 8, 2000).
177. See id. at *27 n.7.
178. See id. at *32.
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individual, the state Treasurer.179  Although the court concluded that as a result
of this structure, the funds could be viewed as a single statutory person for pur-
poses of the PSLRA, the court alternatively could have characterized the Con-
necticut funds as the type of narrow group authorized by the statute—one with
a common decisionmaking structure and a practical and legal relationship inde-
pendent of the litigation.  These features distinguished the Connecticut funds
from the other groups seeking appointment as lead plaintiff.
IV
LEAD COUNSEL AUCTIONS
A. Introductory Issues—Litigation Developments and Selection of Counsel
As indicated above, the lead counsel provision vests the lead plaintiff with
the authority to select and retain lead counsel, subject to the approval of the
court.  Weiss and Beckerman envisioned this authority as enhancing the lead
plaintiff’s ability to monitor the litigation.180  Developments in the competition
for and selection of the lead plaintiff, however, including lawyer-controlled
formation of large lead plaintiff groups and judicial acceptance of aggregation,
have created reasons for concern.  Recent battles for the lead counsel position
have confronted courts with allegations of lawyer misconduct, limited competi-
tion, and inadequate client control.  This has led some courts to question
whether the appointment of the lead plaintiff must automatically be linked to
the selection of counsel.
Initially, plaintiffs’ counsel used the lead plaintiff group as a tool of inclu-
sion.  Rather than compete for the lead counsel position and risk losing the ap-
pointment, firms combined their clients into a single lead plaintiff group, which
then sought to have multiple firms appointed as co-lead counsel.181  Courts be-
gan to question the need for multiple lawyers, however, raising concerns about
excessive legal fees and duplication of effort.182  Although plaintiffs’ firms re-
sponded by assigning more specialized roles to the various lawyers, such as liai-
son counsel and coordinating counsel, these efforts failed to persuade courts
that it was appropriate to designate multiple firms as lead counsel.183
Moreover, the attempts to secure the appointment of multiple law firms
highlighted two of the weaknesses resulting from the use of a lead plaintiff
179. See id. at *89.
180. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2107.
181. See, e.g., Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (describing the ef-
fort by a seven-member proposed lead plaintiff group to appoint “a consortium of law firms to serve as
co-lead counsel for the class”); Fisch, supra note 44, at 548 (describing the pattern in early decisions of
appointing multiple class counsel).
182. See, e.g., In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 183 F.R.D. 404, 419-20 (D.N.J. 1998) (ordering
the lead plaintiff to re-brief the issue of the propriety of multiple lead counsel).
183. See, e.g., Sherleigh Assocs. v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 669, 670 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (rejecting proposed representation by consortium of 10 law firms as not in the best interests of
the plaintiff class).
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group.  First, a group of unrelated investors represented by more than one law-
yer has no inherent decisionmaking structure and, as a result, is poorly
equipped to choose a single firm.  Second, and more important, in most cases
the lead plaintiff groups reflected continuing lawyer control over the litigation
process.  Lawyers recruited clients, assembled lead plaintiff groups, and struc-
tured the appointment of both lead plaintiff and lead counsel.  As a result, it
was unrealistic to view a lead plaintiff group as having selected its lawyer.
Rejection of lead plaintiff groups does not eliminate counsel selection
problems.  Courts have encountered problems with appointing institutional in-
vestors as lead plaintiffs.  At least two courts have concluded that an institution
cannot serve as a lead plaintiff in more than five cases during a three-year pe-
riod, based on a statutory prohibition against professional plaintiffs.184  In addi-
tion, allegations of “pay to play” have been made in several cases.  In Cendant,
for example, a competing lead plaintiff group argued that the CalPERS group,
which consisted of three public pension funds, should not be appointed lead
plaintiff because its counsel had made a substantial contribution to the cam-
paign of the New York State Comptroller.185  Although the Cendant court found
no improper conduct, allegations that institutional investors will select a law
firm on the basis of political contributions undermine judicial willingness to
trust the lead plaintiff’s retention decision.186
Judicial concerns about lawyer control of the client increase in cases in
which institutional investors are not involved.  A court may be troubled by the
prospect of allowing an individual investor to select counsel on behalf of the
plaintiff class and concerned about the ability of an individual to withstand law-
yer control over the litigation.187 As the court explained in Cylink, the “[l]ead
plaintiff, as an individual, almost certainly does not have the expertise and re-
sources of a large institutional investor.  His ability to select and monitor the
conduct of class counsel is, therefore, inherently less than that of the ideal lead
plaintiff.”188
Concerns about mudslinging and excessive lawyer control are united in re-
cent cases involving solicitation of investors by plaintiffs’ firms.  In Network As-
sociates, Waste Management, and other cases, some firms conducted direct
184. See In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 819-22 (N.D. Ohio 1999); Aronson v.
McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1156-57 (N.D. Cal. 1999).  These decisions were based on
the statutory restriction on professional plaintiffs found in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(e)(vi) (Supp. IV 1998).
See Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 820.  But see In re Network Assocs. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1030
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting the argument that the professional plaintiff restriction applies to institu-
tional investors).
185. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 148-49 (D.N.J. 1998).
186. See id. at 152 (explaining that, although the “pay-to-play” charges were not proven, “the auc-
tion is salutary because it removes any speculative doubt about that issue”).
187. The experience of lead plaintiff Charles Chalmers in Digital Lightwave demonstrates the rea-
son for this concern.  See supra note 139 and accompanying text.  But see Penny Arevalo, In Securities
Litigation Cases, Judges are Proactively Selecting Plaintiffs, Counsel, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, July 2000, at
98 (describing lead plaintiff Robert Vatuone in Network Associates as being “very comfortable reading
legal documents, negotiating and telling other lawyers what to do”).
188. Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 587 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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mailings or used brokerage firms to distribute litigation information to stock-
holders for the purpose of recruiting lead plaintiff group members.189  Other
would-be lead counsel subsequently attacked these contacts as misleading, un-
ethical, and felonious.  Although courts have generally rejected these charges,
and the SEC filed a brief in Network Associates defending the practice,190 courts
are reasonably concerned about appointing counsel that has engaged in ques-
tionable conduct.191  Moreover, it is undesirable to select counsel through a pro-
cedure that encourages questionable solicitation practices.
B. A Possible Solution: Lead Counsel Auctions
The developments described above, coupled with preexisting judicial dis-
satisfaction with the selection of counsel and determination of attorneys’ fees in
class action litigation, have led courts to search for a better alternative.  One of
the more creative solutions is the use of a sealed bid auction.192  Under this
model, firms seeking appointment as lead counsel submit bids to the court pro-
posing a fee structure for conducting the litigation.193  The court uses the bids,
and any other information it considers relevant, to select lead counsel.  By se-
lecting a “winning” bid, the court simultaneously selects lead counsel and de-
termines counsel’s fee.194
Although an obvious advantage of lead counsel auctions is their potential to
reduce the cost of litigation,195 courts that have experimented with auctions in
189. See supra notes 153-165 and accompanying text.
190. See Network Amicus Brief, supra note 105.
191. See In re Network Assocs. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-34 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (identifying
the Digital Lightwave “imbroglio” as a sufficient concern to cause the court to require the lead plaintiff
to reopen its consideration of counsel).
192. Cases under the PSLRA in which the court has ordered a lead counsel auction include In re
Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill. 2000); In re Lucent Techs., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137 (D.N.J. 2000); Sherleigh Assocs. v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D.
688 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re Cendant Corp.
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998).  A few courts have also ordered lead counsel auctions in antitrust
class actions.  See In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Order,
April 20, 2000, In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00 Civ. 0648 LAK, 2000 WL 1864036
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Auction Houses Order].
193. Network Associates used a variation of this process.  The lead plaintiff was ordered to select
counsel by conducting a sealed bid auction and to submit his top two choices to the court for approval.
The process resulted in Mr. Vatuone selecting a different firm from those that had initially represented
him in the case.  See In re Network Assocs. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (de-
scribing Vatuone as represented by the law firms of Ruby & Schofield and Manis Faulkner & Morgan);
Order Appointing Class Counsel, supra note 65 (stating court’s approval of the firm of Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann & Bernstein as class counsel).
194. The court in Cendant allowed the lead plaintiffs’ preferred counsel to match the winning bid.
See Cendant, 182 F.R.D. at 151.  The firms chose to do so.  See In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig., 51 F.
Supp. 2d 537, 539 (D.N.J. 1999).  As a result, the auction in Cendant determined the fee award, but did
not select lead counsel.  See Sherleigh Assocs., 184 F.R.D. at 699 (rejecting the request for a similar
“right of first refusal”); see also In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 789
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (allowing lead plaintiff’s original counsel to participate as co-counsel with low bidder
but in a secondary role, if that arrangement were negotiated on a basis acceptable to both firms).
195. See Remarks of C. Boyden Gray, Fees in the High Stakes Litigation of Class Actions and Suits
by Governmental Agencies, Excessive Legal Fees: Protecting Unsophisticated Consumers, Class Ac-
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securities litigation seem to be motivated by the possibility that an auction will
provide a more objective way of selecting lead counsel and a better way of de-
termining an appropriate fee award.  As Judge Walker explained in Oracle, in
which he pioneered the use of the lead counsel auction, the purpose of the auc-
tion was to replicate a market process for the selection and compensation of
lead counsel.196  Similarly, the court in Sherleigh Associates explained that an
auction was consistent with several objectives of the PSLRA, including avoiding
the race to the courthouse and allowing the court to address the agency costs of
the class action by choosing a compensation structure designed to align the in-
terests of the class and counsel.197
Several courts have refined the auction process in an effort to improve on
Judge Walker’s original model.  For example, the court’s order in Oracle gave
counsel little guidance with respect to the bid structure; the court simply or-
dered the bids to correspond to the percentage-of-recovery method of compen-
sation and indicated that counsel could vary the percentage according to speci-
fied contingencies.198 Subsequent auction orders have included litigation
milepost grids that break the litigation, by blocks, into discrete stages and
amounts of recovery.199  Bidding firms are instructed to submit a proposed fee
for each block of the grid.200  Sometimes the court also instructs firms to indicate
how costs will be deducted from the fee award.201
Courts have demanded an increasing quantity of information from bidders
in addition to bid price and structure.  The Oracle court ordered lead counsel
applicants to submit information regarding their qualifications.202  In later cases,
bidders have been asked to describe their qualifications, experience, malprac-
tice coverage, and willingness to post a completion bond.203  Firms have been
asked to demonstrate that they evaluated the case and to specify the range and
likelihood of recovery.204  The Sherleigh Associates court even asked firms to ex-
plain their chosen bid structure in terms of incentives and agency costs.205
tion Members, and Taxpayers/Citizens, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (May 25, 2000) (describing the po-
tential for lead counsel auctions to reduce excessive plaintiffs’ attorneys fees).
196. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 693 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (explaining that judicial
selection of counsel should “make use of the mechanisms of a competitive market”).
197. See Sherleigh Assocs., 184 F.R.D. at 694-95.
198. See Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 697.
199. See, e.g., In re Lucent Techs. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 157 (D.N.J. 2000); Sherleigh Assocs.,
184 F.R.D. at 698; Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 188 F.R.D. 577, 588 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
200. The use of grids facilitates comparison of bids.  See In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions,
96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 786-87 (N.D. Ill. 2000), in which the court, which did not use such a grid, explained
the difficulty of comparing bids with different recovery structures and varying “crossover points.”
201. See, e.g., Sherleigh Assocs., 184 F.R.D. at 697.  See also Cylink, 189 F.R.D. at 572-73 (rejecting
the submitted bid for seeking reimbursement of litigation expenses in addition to attorneys’ fees).
202. See Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 697.
203. See, e.g., Lucent, 194 F.R.D. at 157; Sherleigh Assocs., 184 F.R.D. at 696.
204. See, e.g., Lucent, 194 F.R.D. at 157.
205. See Sherleigh Assocs., 184 F.R.D. at 696.
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Finally, many courts have limited the disclosure of information in connec-
tion with the submission of bids.206  The Oracle order required firms to prepare
their bids independently and prohibited them from conferring with other firms
or revealing their bids prior to filing with the court.207  In the opinion announc-
ing the appointment of counsel, however, Judge Walker disclosed both the
identities of the bidders and details of the submitted bids.208 In contrast, the
court in Cendant disclosed no information about the auction until a proposed
settlement had been submitted to the courtalmost nineteen months after the
auction was conductedexcept to announce that the lead plaintiffs’ chosen
firms had agreed to match the winning bids.  At that point, the court released a
heavily redacted description of the bids, without disclosing the identities of the
bidders.209  Similarly, the court in Sherleigh Associates explained that its order
analyzing the submitted bids would be filed under seal during the pendency of
the litigation.210  In addition, although the court in Cendant allowed firms to
submit bids jointly, the more recent auction orders have forbidden joint bids.211
It is unclear whether this development was motivated by a desire to increase
competition or to avoid collusion.
C. Implementation of Lead Counsel Auctions—Practical Considerations
Lead counsel auctions remain a work in progress.  Judicial experience with
the auction process is limited, and few cases utilizing an auction have pro-
gressed to a stage in which it is possible to evaluate the result.  Nonetheless, the
initial experience suggests a variety of practical problems with the design and
implementation of lead counsel auctions that, to date, have not been adequately
addressed by the courts.  The fundamental question is whether it is appropriate
to select counsel by auction.  Although, as indicated above, auctions can allow
courts to avoid a number of problems associated with the selection of class
counsel, the characteristic feature of an auction is the comparison of bids on the
basis of price.212  For bids to provide the court with an objective basis on which
206. But see In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 785-87 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(disclosing full information on firm identities and bid details in connection with selection decision).
207. See Oracle, 131 F.R.D. at 697.
208. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 539-41 (N.D. Cal. 1990).  Judge Walker made a
similar disclosure in Cylink.  See Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 191 F.R.D. 600, 603-05 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Cylink, 189 F.R.D. 570, 574-75 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
209. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 387 (D.N.J. 1998) (partially unsealed by the court on
Apr. 7, 2000).
210. See Sherleigh Assocs. v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 669, 671 (S.D. Fla.
1999); see also Sherleigh Assocs., 184 F.R.D. at 698 (stating that the “bids may be permanently sealed or
redacted thereafter to protect proprietary information”).
211. See, e.g., In re Lucent Techs. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 157 (D.N.J. 2000) (stating that joint
proposals will not be considered); Sherleigh Assocs., 184 F.R.D. at 695.
212. See Paul R. Milgrom, Auction Theory, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY FIFTH WORLD
CONGRESS 2 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987).
FISCH_FMT.DOC 04/19/01  1:22 PM
Page 53: Spring/Summer 2001]SELECTING LEAD COUNSEL UNDER THE PSLRA 83
to distinguish among counsel, the court’s determination must focus primarily on
price.213
As a result, contrary to Judge Walker’s claim in Oracle, lead counsel auc-
tions do not replicate the market process for selection of counsel.  Clients in the
market for legal services do not choose their lawyer based solely on price.  In-
deed, the depth of the market for legal services, with its wide variation in billing
rates, demonstrates the importance of non-price considerations.  As in many
markets, lawyer price and quality are often directly related.  Those lawyers who
offer higher quality legal services are able to command a higher price for their
services.  Less qualified lawyers charge a lower price.  Lawyer quality is an im-
portant component of the selection process because a higher quality lawyer
maximizes the client’s expected recovery by increasing the likelihood of recov-
ery, the amount of recovery, or both.  Thus, although defendants would pre-
sumably favor an auction that relies primarily on price to select plaintiffs’ coun-
sel, the interests of the class require the court to consider lawyer quality and to
reject an auction procedure that focuses exclusively on price.
Accordingly, the court must evaluate the quality of prospective lead counsel.
It is unclear whether courts are equipped to make such an evaluation.  Courts
have had little success evaluating quality in the auction context.  In Oracle,
Judge Walker attempted to evaluate firm quality but found that the material
submitted by the bidding firms was not helpful in assessing firm quality; he con-
cluded that it was “impossible objectively to distinguish among these firms in
terms of their background, experience and legal abilities.”214  As a result, Judge
Walker’s decision was made exclusively on the basis of price, despite the illogic
of that approach.215
The court’s analysis in Cendant, in contrast, claimed to take quality consid-
erations into account.216  The court explicitly rejected some firms on the basis of
quality factors, concluding for example that several bidders had not demon-
strated sufficient securities trial experience.217  The court did not indicate, how-
ever, either why trial experience was the key consideration in evaluating quality
or how the court reached the conclusion that the experience of these bidders
was deficient.  Nor did the court’s inquiry, at least as revealed in its opinion,
seem to consider firm reputation, quality of investigation, or any other quality
213. The decision in In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788 (N.D. Ill.
2000), illustrates such an analysis.  The court compared the competing bids solely on the basis of price
and, after presumptively selecting the winning firm, reviewed the firm’s qualifications and determined
that it qualified as a “responsible bidder.”  Id. at 788-89.
214. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 542 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
215. See id. at 542 n.10 (explaining that “none of the bidders has demonstrated qualitative distinc-
tions sufficient to outweigh price considerations”).
216. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 387, 390 (D.N.J. 2000) (explaining that the most im-
portant criteria to the court in evaluating bids were litigation experience, fiscal ability, and the pro-
posed fee schedule).
217. See id. at 388, 391.
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factors.218  Although trial experience may be an important consideration, given
that securities class actions rarely proceed to trial, trial experience would
probably not be paramount in a client’s selection decision.  Moreover, an oth-
erwise qualified firm could always obtain the services of specialized trial counsel
to deal with the contingency of a trial.
The court in Sherleigh Associates apparently viewed the Cendant court’s
consideration of quality as limited, describing the Cendant auction as based on
price alone.219  In Sherleigh Associates, Judge Lenard claimed that, unlike the
Cendant court, she had constructed an auction with both qualitative and price
considerations.220  Judge Lenard instructed counsel that she would evaluate bid
proposals on a price-quality continuum with quality considerations, including
the bid structure, the firm’s experience in securities litigation, the firm’s qualifi-
cations to complete the work, and evidence that the firm had evaluated the
case.221  The court failed, however, to provide any criteria indicating how these
factors would be evaluated.  If a court does not specify precisely which factors
demonstrate firm quality, it can use quality factors to rationalize the selection of
whichever firm it chooses.
The court’s analysis in Wenderhold v. Cylink222 illustrates this problem.  Al-
though a bidder might reasonably assume that firm size, a local office, and liti-
gation experience within the circuit would be quality factors that weighed in its
favor, the Cylink court concluded that precisely the opposite was true.  Bidder
Weiss & Yourman argued that its larger size, West Coast office, and securities
litigation experience within the circuit were qualitative advantages.223  Instead,
Judge Walker concluded that the quality analysis favored bidder Innelli &
Molder because the firm’s smaller size, absence of a West Coast office, and ab-
sence of litigation experience in the circuit would give it greater incentives to
succeed.224  A court’s assessment of firm quality seems arbitrary when a firm’s
small size or lack of litigation experience can be either a benefit or a detriment
for purposes of quality evaluation.
As these cases demonstrate, evaluation of firm quality is difficult.  The in-
herent difficulty for courts in evaluating firm quality makes it difficult for high
quality firms to distinguish themselves so as to justify the higher price they
command for their legal services.  The knowledge that they cannot compete
with lower quality firms on the basis of price may cause high quality firms to
drop out of an auction they cannot win, rather than needlessly incur the costs of
participation.  This creates a potential “lemons” problem, in which lower qual-
218. The court did reject one bidder for having accused a lead plaintiff of wrongdoing.  See id. at
391.
219. See Sherleigh Assocs. v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 669, 671 (S.D. Fla.
1999).
220. See id.
221. See Sherleigh Assocs., 184 F.R.D. 688, 696 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
222. 191 F.R.D. 600 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
223. See id. at 602.
224. See id. at 602-03.
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ity lawyers are disproportionately represented in the pool of bidding firms.225  In
addition, the subjective nature of the quality evaluation threatens to undermine
the potential objectivity of the auction process.226  Alternatively, a court may
place undue emphasis on the lowest bid and use quality considerations in an ef-
fort to justify a choice that has been made primarily on the basis of price.
Even if a court restricts its analysis to bid price, the task of identifying the
winning bid is not trivial.  As auctions have gotten more sophisticated, the bids
have become increasingly complex.  Courts require firms to submit bids that
specify recovery rates that vary depending on the occurrence of various contin-
gencies, including the stage at which the litigation is terminated and the amount
of damages recovered.227  Unlike a typical auction, in which the auctioneer can
readily calculate which bid provides the best price, in a lead counsel auction, the
court must predict the course of the litigation and estimate the likely recovery
to determine the amount of each bid and compare competing bids.228
The complexity of the bids stems, in part, from judicial recognition that bid
structure, in addition to bid price, is important.  Different bid structures create a
variety of incentive problems due to the conflict between the interests of coun-
sel and the interests of the plaintiff class.229  Accordingly, a court must consider
the incentive effects created by each bid structure and how those effects are
likely to influence the conduct of the litigation and the recovery to the plaintiff
class.
Unfortunately, each structure has advantages and disadvantages.  For ex-
ample, a bid structure in which counsel receives a declining percentage-of-
recovery encourages an early settlement of the case, which may shortchange
class members and provide additional compensation to counsel.  This effect is
enhanced if the bid places a cap on costs or requires counsel to pay costs out of
the fee award.  Also, at high levels of recovery, a declining percentage fee struc-
ture does not align counsel’s interests with those of the class and, therefore, may
provide insufficient incentive for counsel to pursue recovery beyond a certain
level.230  At the extreme, a fee structure that includes a cap on attorneys’ fees
eliminates any incentive for counsel to pursue a recovery beyond that point.231
On the other hand, as Judge Walker observed, the attorney effort necessary to
obtain increased levels of recovery typically does not increase at the same rate
225. See, e.g., George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 QUART. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (describing lemons problem); see also Niebler, supra note
34, at 777-78 (applying “lemons” analysis to lead counsel auctions).
226. It may also be argued that judicial evaluation of firm quality interferes with the court’s neutral-
ity.
227. See, e.g., In re Lucent Techs. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 157 (D.N.J. 2000).
228. See Affidavit of Jill E. Fisch, May 3, 2000, at 9-11, In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00
Civ. 0648, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18325 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20 2000) [hereinafter Auction Houses Affida-
vit] (demonstrating how bid structures require the court to estimate the likely recovery to determine
which bid offers the best price).
229. See Niebler, supra note 34, at 29-30.
230. See id.
231. A cap is practically equivalent to a percentage-of-recovery that declines to zero.
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as the level of recovery.232  A declining percentage-of-recovery requires counsel
to share those economies with the plaintiff class.233
An alternative is to award counsel an increasing percentage-of-recovery.  In
theory, this structure should reduce counsel’s motivation to sell out cheaply.
Moreover, increasing counsel’s motivation to pursue a larger recovery benefits
the class as long as counsel’s percentage-of-recovery remains below 100%.
Nonetheless, this structure can produce extremely large fees in cases involving
large recoveries, causing most courts to view increasing percentage bid struc-
tures with skepticism.234  Because the court does not know the amount of recov-
ery at the time it selects counsel, it is difficult for the court to commit to a pro-
posed fee that might be large in terms of percentage and/or dollar amount.
Review of the few cases in which lead counsel auctions have been used pro-
vides some examples of poor judicial selection, suggesting that courts cannot
easily predict the potential adverse consequences of a proposed fee structure.
For example, in selecting counsel in Oracle, Judge Walker identified a fee dis-
count for early settlement and a cap on litigation expenses as important fac-
tors.235  Subsequently, the case settled precisely at the point at which class coun-
sel hit the cap on expenses.236  Moreover, the case did not settle within the
window that would have provided a discounted fee award.237  Recovery to the
class was approximately 24.5% of the claimed damages, a rate that at least one
commentator has described as a benchmark settlement rate in securities fraud
class actions.238
The bid structure selected in In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation 239
was even more problematic.  The winning bid proposed a fee structure in which
counsel received a declining percentage-of-recovery up to $25 million and no
percentage of amounts recovered over $25 million.240  The case then settled al-
most immediately, by some accounts for exactly $25 million.241  Clearly the fee
structure gave counsel no incentive to hold out for a recovery greater than $25
232. See Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 189 F.R.D. 570, 572 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
233. See id.
234. See Niebler, supra note 34, at 783-84 (describing judicial preference for declining marginal con-
tingency fees); id. at 790 (explaining that courts have viewed increasing percentage fee arrangements
with “extreme hostility”).
235. See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 542, 545 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
236. See Coffee Declaration, supra note 39, at 3 (describing the settlement of Oracle as occurring “at
exactly the point at which the Lowey firm hit the ceiling on its expense reimbursement proposal”).
237. See id.
238. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions,  43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 517 (1991).
239. 918 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
240. See Coffee Declaration, supra note 39, at 4.
241. See id.  But see Robert A. Swift, Attorney, Columnist Tangle over Bidding Process, NAT’L L.J.,
Oct. 12, 1998, at A20 (stating that the civil case settled for almost $50 million); Archer Daniels to settle
lawsuits for $65 million; Company was accused of hiding price fixing, BALT. SUN, Sept. 28, 1996, at 20C
(stating that Archer Daniels Midland agreed to pay $30 million to settle the class action by investors).
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million; a higher recovery would have yielded no increase in the fee award.242
Moreover, the rapid settlement, occurring merely two months after the cases
were consolidated,243 and the relatively low recovery in comparison to the crimi-
nal fine,244 indicate that the court’s selection of the winning bid was probably
based on an erroneously low estimation of the potential recovery.
In a lead counsel auction conducted in an antitrust case, not a securities
case, the court in In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litigation sought to design an
auction structure that would eliminate the incentive for an early, cheap settle-
ment.245  Modifying Andrew Niebler’s proposal,246 the court initially requested
counsel to submit bids according to a three-tiered structure in which the plain-
tiff class would receive the first tier of the recovery, counsel would receive the
second tier, and any additional recovery would be split between the class and
counsel in a three-to-one ratio.247  The court ordered prospective lead counsel to
bid by specifying the proposed size of the first two tiers.248  Ultimately, perhaps
in recognition of the deficiencies presented by its structure and the potential
difficulties in bid evaluation,249 the court modified the auction structure to pro-
duce a simpler model in which plaintiffs’ counsel would be compensated at a
rate of twenty-five percent, but the plaintiff class would receive 100% of some
initial recovery threshold before attorneys’ fees would be applied.250  Bidding
firms were asked to specify the initial recovery threshold.  Although this modi-
fication simplified the process of evaluating competing bids, from the firm’s
perspective, it resulted in a structure that was substantially similar to the stan-
dard benchmark fee award,251 with the attendant incentive problems identified
in Niebler’s article.252
Finally, the court in Cendant253 accepted a bid that provided for a higher fee
award than plaintiffs’ counsel would have received under the retainer agree-
ment negotiated by the New York City Pension Funds.  In papers challenging
class counsel’s request for the fee set by the lead counsel auction, the New York
242. This issue was apparently not of concern to Judge Shadur, who subsequently indicated his re-
ceptiveness toward fee caps in In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. Ill.
2000).  See also id. at 787 (selecting bid that provided a cap of $2.75 million on total fees).
243. See id.
244. See, e.g., Angela Wissman, ADM Execs Nailed on Price-Fixing, May Do Time; Government
Gets Watershed Convictions, But Company Still Dominates Lysine Market, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Oct.
1998, at 1 (describing ADM’s payment of record $100 million criminal fine for price-fixing).
245. See In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00 Civ. 0648, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18325
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2000).
246. See Niebler, supra note 34, at 821-30.
247. See Auction Houses Order, supra note 192 (describing terms of auction).
248. See id.
249. See Auction Houses Affidavit, supra note 228 (identifying problems with proposed bid struc-
ture).
250. See Auction Houses Order, supra note 192 (altering terms of the previous bidding structure).
251. The modified fee structure could be characterized as an increasing percentage-of-recovery fee
with an initial rate of zero.
252. Alternatively, the modified structure could be characterized as an increasing percentage-of-
recovery fee with an initial rate of zero.
253. 191 F.R.D. 387 (D.N.J. 1998) (partially unsealed by the court on Apr. 7, 2000).
FISCH_FMT.DOC 04/19/01  1:22 PM
88 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 64: Nos. 2&3
City Pension Funds asserted that the bid chosen by the court provided for a fee
award that was $76 million higher than the result produced under the retainer
agreement and yielded a fee of $10,861 per hour for class counsel.254
The difficulties in evaluating the most appropriate fee structure suggest that
courts should exercise caution in articulating a preference.255  If a court does not
state a preference, however, and accepts bids that vary in structure, the court, as
auctioneer, is comparing incomparables—apples and oranges—to determine
the best bid.
In addition, a court that accepts bids that vary along multiple dimensions—
for example, price, bid structure, and firm quality—must determine how to
weigh the different facets of the bids.  It is possible to evaluate bids according to
multiple criteria.  The bids submitted by would-be government contractors are
subject to scoring on the basis of both price and quality factors.256  This type of
scoring is vastly different, however, from the ad hoc treatment of quality and
bid structure evidenced by the lead counsel auction opinions published to date.
Although Judge Walker has defended lead counsel auctions because they
allow the court to determine the fee award at the outset of the case,257 the task of
comparing bids is hampered by the limited information available to the court at
that time.  The court must determine the likely recovery and predict the process
by which that recovery will be achieved.  The court must then evaluate each bid
against those predictions to determine how the proposed structure will affect
counsel’s ability to achieve the predicted outcome.258  The auction requires the
court to make these predictions at the outset of the case, before discovery re-
veals the facts and before motion practice uncovers the legal issues.  Accord-
ingly, the court has extremely limited information on the probability, amount,
and range of possible recovery.
In contrast, if the court decides on the appropriate fee award at the conclu-
sion of the case, the court can assess the amount and the quality of counsel’s
work effort.  Moreover, although the court may not have complete information
on the merits of the case, particularly if the case is resolved by settlement, the
court is likely to have a better sense of the strength of the case and the degree
254. See Daniel Wise, NYC Moves to Slash Cendant Fees, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 2, 2000, at
4 (describing the challenge to the fee award).  The court subsequently adhered to the fee determined by
the auction.  See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 285, 306 (D.N.J. 2000).
255. Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Class Auctions, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 14, 1998, at B6
(“Courts have assumed too glibly that they know which bid is best”) with Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp.,
191 F.R.D. 600, 602 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (adopting the “twin principles that the ratio of fees and expenses
should decline as recovery increases and increase as the litigation progresses”).
256. See, e.g., Yeon-Koo Chee, Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions, 24 RAND.
J. ECON. 668, 668-69 (1993) (describing the “elaborate scoring system” used by the Department of De-
fense to evaluate source bids based on quality and price factors).
257. See Remarks of Judge Vaughn Walker, Fees in the High Stakes Litigation of Class Actions and
Suits by Governmental Agencies, Excessive Legal Fees: Protecting Unsophisticated Consumers, Class
Action Members, and Taxpayers/Citizens, U.S. Chamber of Commerce (May 25, 2000) (arguing that
auctions are valuable because they determine the fee award ex ante).
258. Judge Shadur’s opinion in In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D.
Ill. 2000), contains the most detailed analysis of this process.
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of risk associated with the litigation.  Most important, by reserving its determi-
nation of the appropriate fee award until the conclusion of the case, the court
can address many of the incentive problems previously identified.  If the court
believes that counsel has successfully piggybacked on government enforcement
efforts, it can use the lodestar structure to compensate counsel for counsel’s ac-
tual efforts.259  A court can also address the concern that counsel will run up ex-
cessive hours by limiting the fee to a percentage of the recovery.  Moreover, so
long as the court has the flexibility to use either compensation method, coun-
sel’s incentive to make decisions contrary to the interests of the plaintiff class,
such as a collusive early settlement, will be minimized.260
The plaintiff class also is exposed to substantial risk if the court mistakenly
selects as counsel a firm that has made an unrealistically low bid.  Although
ethical considerations would presumably preclude the firm from abandoning
the representation, a firm is unlikely to continue to invest resources that it does
not expect to recover.261  Moreover, defendants may take advantage of the auc-
tion selection process by resisting early and reasonable attempts to resolve the
case in an effort to disrupt counsel’s anticipated cost structure.262
Although counsel may be better positioned to estimate the expected recov-
ery than the court, counsel, too, lacks complete information at the outset of the
case.263  This creates an additional difficulty for a prospective bidder.  Where
bidders bid for an item of unknown value, an auction model known as the
common value model,264 the successful bidder is the one who estimates the value
of the item at the highest level.  Because this bidder will have made an estimate
that is higher than any other bidder, and because the bidders are acting without
full information about the outcome of the litigation, the winning bidder will
therefore face the risk of overpayment, or the “winner’s curse” problem.265  The
possibility of overpayment causes rational bidders to discount for that risk and
can lead to inefficient, rather than competitive, prices.266
259. See, e.g., Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding
the trial court’s refusal to apply a multiplier where counsel benefitted from information generated by
parallel government investigations).
260. See id. at 49-50 (reaffirming the power of the district court to utilize either the lodestar or per-
centage-of-recovery method of calculating fees).
261. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “Auction Houses”: Legal Ethics and the Class Action, N.Y.L.J., May 18,
2000, at 5 (describing the dilemma faced by class counsel under a fee structure that fails to align coun-
sel’s incentives with those of the plaintiff class); Niebler, supra note 34, at 781 (arguing that low fee
awards tend to cause lawyers to underfund class litigation).
262. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 254 (citing examples of the incentives provided by particular bid
structures for strategic behavior by defendants).
263. But see In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 387, 390-91 (D.N.J. 2000) (rejecting several bids
as unrealistically low).
264. See, e.g., R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LIT. 699,
720 (1987) (explaining common value auctions).
265. Id. at 720-21 (explaining winner’s curse problem).
266. See id. at 721 (stating that a rational bidder may bid less to avoid becoming a victim of the win-
ner’s curse).
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Apart from the risk of overpayment, the preparation of a bid is costly.267  A
bidding firm must investigate the case and predict the expected recovery under
various litigation scenarios, as well as the cost associated with each possible re-
covery, to propose a rational bid structure.  In the absence of careful investiga-
tion, a firm exposes itself to the risk that it will not cover its opportunity costs if
it wins the auction.  On the other hand, all costs of bid preparation are a dead-
weight loss if the firm is not the successful bidder.  Accordingly, these costs may
deter firms from bidding.
Lack of bidder participation is a serious risk in lead counsel auctions, be-
cause if firms do not bid, an auction will reduce rather than increase competi-
tion.  In addition, limited bidder participation drastically reduces the likelihood
that an auction will result in an efficient allocation of resources or an appropri-
ate price.268  Several of the cases in which courts have used auctions suggest that
the risk of limited bidder participation is real.  For example, only four firms
submitted bids in the Oracle auction,269 and Judge Walker had to conduct two
rounds of bidding to obtain a total of three bids in Cylink.270  The auction in In
re California Micro Devices Securities Litigation271 resulted in only two bids, al-
though seventeen firms had previously entered appearances representing mem-
bers of the plaintiff class.272  Even the auction conducted in In re Amino Acid
Lysine Antitrust Litigation resulted in the submission of only eight bids, despite
the fact that approximately thirty-eight firms had entered an appearance prior
to the court’s decision to use an auction.273
The foregoing analysis does not demonstrate that it is impossible to con-
struct a workable lead counsel auction.  Nor does it reject the concerns about
excessive fees, lack of competition, and lawyer control that have motivated
courts to experiment with the auction process.  Indeed, Congress created the
lead plaintiff provision in an effort to address these same concerns.  In the next
section, this article demonstrates that the client empowerment model of the
lead plaintiff provision is incompatible with and undermined by the lead coun-
sel auction.
267. These costs are increased where the bidder has incomplete information about the market, as
well as incomplete information about the value of the lead counsel position.  Given the degree of varia-
tion in bids and bid structures, restrictions on disclosure of bid information reduce competition among
bidders.
268. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 263, at 711, 721 (describing the efficiencies of the auction
process under the assumption of perfect competition).
269. In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
270. Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp., 191 F.R.D. 600, 601 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Wenderhold v. Cylink
Corp., 189 F.R.D. 570, 572 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
271. 168 F.R.D. 257 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
272. See Sherleigh Assocs. v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 688, 700 n.2 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (describing the result of competitive bidding in California Micro Devices).
273. 918 F. Supp. 1190, 1190-92 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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D. Lead Counsel Auctions and the PSLRA
Even if it were possible to design an appropriate auction model, there are
serious reasons to question whether courts have authority under the PSLRA to
employ an auction to select lead counsel.  Although the Oracle decision pre-
dated the PSLRA, subsequent judicial use of lead counsel auctions has relied
heavily on Oracle,274 and courts have devoted relatively little analysis to the ef-
fect of the lead plaintiff provision on their authority to select lead counsel.275
Courts employing auctions have relied on traditional judicial authority to
select counsel and award counsel fees.  The PSLRA does not eliminate this
authority completely.  Indeed, as indicated above, courts that have been faced
with requests to appoint large consortia of lead counsel in post-PSLRA cases
have been forced to determine the extent to which deference to the lead plain-
tiff’s choice of counsel is appropriate.  Moreover, the PSLRA retains an af-
firmative role for the court in counsel selection, by authorizing the court to ap-
prove or reject the lead plaintiff’s choice.276  Citing the Conference Report on
the statute, the courts in Milestone Scientific and Cendant explained that the
lead plaintiff does not come inextricably tied to its counsel.277  Finally, the
PSLRA contains no language removing fee awards from the court’s authority.
Once the authority to set counsel fees and to reject the lead plaintiff’s choice of
counsel is acknowledged, it seems but a small step to conclude that the court
may use an auction process to select lead counsel and determine the fee award.
The auction device appears no more problematic than the percentage-of-
recovery or lodestar methods of determining counsel fees, both of which are
also creatures of judicial creation.
This conclusion, however, is inconsistent with the language of the PSLRA.
The statutory text clearly vests the lead plaintiff, not the court, with the author-
ity to select lead counsel.278  Although the court can exercise veto power over
the lead plaintiff’s selection, the statute provides no basis for the court to over-
ride the plaintiff’s selection and to impose its choice of counsel or to presume
that it exercises complete discretion with respect to such selection.
On the other hand, the statute does not describe the court’s role when the
plaintiff’s choice of counsel is unacceptable.  What are the consequences if the
court determines that the lead plaintiff is incapable of selecting counsel, if the
court rejects a proffered lead counsel consortium, or if the court rejects the lead
274. See, e.g., Sherleigh Assocs., 184 F.R.D. at 693.  The court also relied heavily on the analysis of
auction theory in Andrew Niebler’s law review article.  See id., citing Niebler, supra note 34.
275. See In re Lucent Techs. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 156 (D.N.J. 2000) (justifying the auction
procedure as “necessary to protect the interests of the proposed class” and limiting its analysis to cita-
tions of Cendant and Cylink decisions).
276. See CONF. REP., supra note 19, at 33-35 (“The Conference Committee does not intend to dis-
turb the court’s discretion under existing law to approve or disapprove the lead plaintiff’s choice of
counsel when necessary to protect the interests of the plaintiff class.”).
277. See In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 176 (D.N.J. 1999); In re Cendant Corp.
Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 149 (D.N.J. 1998).
278. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (Supp. IV 1998).
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plaintiff’s choice as unqualified?  The statute fails to provide guidelines for the
scope of judicial review of the lead plaintiff’s selection.279  Nor does it explain
what happens when a court exercises its veto power over the plaintiff’s choice.
In the absence of textual guidance, it is appropriate to look again to the ob-
jectives of the statutory scheme.  Importantly, the Oracle decision was predi-
cated on the conclusion that no single class member had a sufficient stake to
oversee the litigation and that, as a result, no one would “shop around” among
the interested law firms to negotiate the best terms for representation.280  In
adopting the PSLRA, Congress created an affirmative structure designed to
change this result.281  Lead plaintiffs, particularly institutional investors, are
armed with the statutory authority to select counsel and control litigation deci-
sions and therefore have the power to introduce a competitive market process
into securities litigation.
Lead plaintiff auctions interfere with the statutory objective of client
empowerment by displacing the plaintiff’s authority over counsel selection.  The
PSLRA empowers the lead plaintiff to monitor class counsel by (1) selecting
appropriate counsel; (2) negotiating a fee structure that minimizes agency costs
and creates appropriate incentives for lawyer decisionmaking; (3) negotiating a
fee that reflects market forces; and (4) exercising continuing oversight through-
out the course of the litigation.  This monitoring can potentially reduce the ex-
cessive lawyer control targeted by the PSLRA.
Judicial selection of counsel, by an auction or otherwise, thwarts the lead
plaintiff’s ability to monitor the process.  The plaintiff’s efforts to select appro-
priate counsel and negotiate a fee agreement are undermined if the court is free
to select another lawyer.  The lead plaintiff cannot be expected to develop a
close working relationship with a lawyer appointed by the court.  Nor can the
lead plaintiff be expected to monitor court-appointed counsel effectively, ab-
sent control over counsel’s compensation in the case at bar and the potential for
repeat business in comparable cases.
Moreover, the lead plaintiff structure is designed to select lead plaintiffs that
are particularly well suited to monitor class counsel.  As indicated above, for
example, Congress expressed the desire to encourage institutional investors to
serve as lead plaintiffs.282  Because of their substantial stakes, sophistication, and
status as repeat players in securities litigation, institutions are particularly well
279. See, e.g., Laborers Local 1298 Pension Fund v. Campbell Soup Co., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 90,963, at 94,222 (D.N.J. May 17, 2000) (directing lead plaintiffs to meet to dis-
cuss the appointment of class counsel and specifying a variety of criteria to be considered by the court
in deciding whether to approve the plaintiffs’ selection).
280. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2088-94 (describing this conclusion and refuting it
with respect to securities class actions by demonstrating the prevalence of claimants with substantial
stakes).
281. Moreover, Congress had the auction alternative available to it at the time that it adopted the
PSLRA.  Macey & Miller’s article on class action auctions, supra note 9, and the Oracle decision both
predated the statute.  See also Testimony of Arthur Miller, supra note 150, at 159 (identifying various
shortcomings of the auction procedure to Congress).
282. See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying test.
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suited to monitor plaintiffs’ counsel and to negotiate sophisticated compensa-
tion agreements that reduce legal fees and minimize agency costs.283  Even when
the lead plaintiff is an individual investor rather than an institution, the lead
plaintiff is likely to be an individual of substantial net worth, with business ex-
pertise and experience in dealing with lawyers, as well as a significant stake in
the litigation.  Such an investor is fully capable of selecting counsel.
With respect to the amount and structure of fee awards, the lead plaintiff
provision is particularly promising.  Weiss and Beckerman hoped that the lead
plaintiff provision would enable institutions and other large investors to negoti-
ate fee arrangements with class counsel ex ante, thereby causing fee awards in
class actions to conform more closely to market rates.284  Institutional investors
seemingly engage in precisely this type of negotiation.  A number of institu-
tional investors have claimed in public statements that they have negotiated fee
agreements in shareholder litigation that are substantially below industry
benchmarks.285
Judicial override of the lead plaintiff’s decision will impede these develop-
ments and frustrate the statutory objectives.  Auctions would likely deter insti-
tutional investors from seeking appointment as lead plaintiffs because of their
reluctance to take on the responsibility of the lead plaintiff position without the
ability to work with their choice of counsel.  This is particularly true when an in-
stitutional investor has conducted an active search and negotiated a fee agree-
ment.  In Network Associates,286 for example, the Board of Pensions of the City
of Philadelphia withdrew its application to serve as lead plaintiff after the court
refused to accept its choice of counsel and instead ordered an auction.287
From a policy perspective, lead counsel auctions have several shortcomings.
In addition to the practical issues presented by the auction structure, a selection
process that disregards differences in the competing firms’ early efforts creates
undesirable incentives with respect to future litigation.  The public interest is
served by lawyers who carefully conduct investigations prior to filing a com-
plaint.  Indeed, the pleading standards of the PSLRA require such investigation
for a complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss.  Investigation, however, is
costly, and a lawyer’s investigatory efforts are penalized if they can be appro-
priated by a low-bidding latecomer.  Under the auction model, the firms that
perform work early in a case face a risk that they will not be compensated;288
283. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 16, at 2121-23.
284. See id. at 2107.
285. See supra note 57.
286. 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
287. See CA Judge Picks Lone Investor for Lead Plaintiff After Others Balk, PROF. LIAB. LITIG.
REP. Jan. 17, 2000, at 8 (describing a Philadelphia retirement fund’s refusal to proceed as lead plaintiff
if required to conduct a sealed bid auction to select lead counsel).
288. Cf. In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 790 n.13 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(acknowledging that a rejected bidder had undertaken the responsibility of preparing the consolidated
class action complaint and stating, without further specification as to the details, the court’s expectation
that the firm would be “fully compensated” for these services).
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firms that do no initial work preserve lower cost structures that give them an
advantage in the auction.289
Finally, lead counsel auctions are based on an activist role for the court as
monitor of the litigation and guardian for the plaintiff class.  It is not clear that
this role is either desirable or consistent with the PSLRA.  There is no reason to
believe that judicially conducted auctions will produce better prices or more
appropriate fee structures than negotiations by lead plaintiffs.  Selection of
counsel is a business decision, and courts are poorly suited to make business de-
cisions.290  Indeed, the fact that the Cendant auction resulted in a fee structure in
which counsel received a higher award than counsel would have received under
the privately negotiated fee agreement underscores this point.291
It is also fair to read the adoption of the PSLRA as reflecting some degree
of congressional skepticism about the ability of the courts effectively to super-
vise the process of selecting class counsel.  The legislative history of the PSLRA
reflects congressional frustration over many attributes of the litigation system
that developed under judicial oversight.292  For example, the judicially created
first-to-file rule provided the incentives that produced the race to the court-
house.  The absence of a notice requirement precluded competition among
would-be lead plaintiffs and their counsel.  The courts’ refusal to evaluate care-
fully the credentials of the class representatives led to the disempowerment of
the class representative and the consequent lawyer control over litigation deci-
sions.  Finally, judicial control over plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, coupled with the
courts’ reluctance to refuse fee requests or to deviate from traditional bench-
marks, has led to excessive fee awards.  Although it is unfair to hold the courts
responsible for all these problems, in many cases the courts’ acceptance of ques-
tionable practices as well as judicially created incentives contributed to the po-
tential for abuse.293
The court’s activist role may create an additional set of agency problems.
Although the agency costs created by the divergence of lawyer and class inter-
ests are well recognized, there is a less-recognized gap between the interests of
the judge and the plaintiff class.  The pressures imposed by limited resources
and crowded dockets have caused courts to take a more managerial approach to
289. The auction also creates the possibility of wasted work effort, if the bidding process displaces a
firm that has done substantial investigation.  The court’s choice of preauction procedures may exacer-
bate this problem.  In Bank One, for example, because the court had not completed the auction when
the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, the court required all the competing firms to respond to the
motion.  See In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6027, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill.
2000).  Nonetheless, the court’s order did not provide that unsuccessful bidders would be compensated
for their efforts in responding to the motion.
290. This fact is reflected, in corporate law, by the business judgment rule.  See generally DENNIS J.
BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 6-7 (4th ed. 1993).
291. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
292. See supra Part II(A) (describing structure of class actions prior to the adoption of the PSLRA).
293. See, e.g., CONF. REP., supra note 19, at 33 (explaining how two judicially created incentives
have driven the race to the courthouse: (1) courts have appointed counsel on a first-come, first-served
basis without sufficient consideration of the quality of the complaint; and (2) courts have generally ap-
pointed the lead plaintiff based on the first filed complaint).
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judging.  Where, as in class actions, judges have extensive power to dictate the
litigation process and results, there is a risk that they will use this power in a
manner that does not reflect the best interests of the plaintiff class.294
By casting the court as auctioneer and referee, lead counsel auctions also
threaten the court’s neutrality.  First, as indicated above, in evaluating the auc-
tion bids, the court must form an opinion on the merits of the case and the pre-
dicted recovery.295  This opinion, formed without the benefit of discovery or any
submission by the defendant, may influence the court’s subsequent evaluation
of a motion or a proposed settlement.  Second, the court’s selection of counsel,
which includes a determination that counsel is qualified and has made a reason-
able evaluation of the case, may create an unintentional bias that the defendant
cannot overcome.  Indeed, having conducted an auction, the court may be par-
ticularly unwilling to terminate the case in a manner that would preclude class
counsel from recovering a reasonable fee.  Third, judicial control over the selec-
tion of counsel makes counsel accountable to the court, not to the class.  This
control may allow institutional factors, such as judicial interest in docket con-
trol, to influence litigation decisionmaking.
The PSLRA responds to and displaces any justification for lead counsel auc-
tions in securities litigation.  Although lead counsel auctions offer a potential
solution to concerns over excessive fees, lawyer control, and lack of judicially
manageable standards for oversight, the PSLRA instead rejects the court-
centered auction solution in favor of empowering the lead plaintiff.  The client
empowerment structure of the PSLRA can be understood as a mechanism for
reducing the supervisory role of the court.  Because lead counsel auctions, by
retaining judicial authority over the selection of class counsel, interfere with the
lead plaintiff’s role, they are inconsistent with the statutory structure.
V
CONCLUSION
Application of the lead plaintiff provision of the PSLRA has resulted in the
development of two disturbing trends, aggregation and auctions.  The trends
deal with facially separate issues: aggregation relates to the appointment of the
lead plaintiff, and auctions address the selection of counsel.  Nonetheless, they
are disturbing for the same reasons.  First, both aggregation and lead counsel
auctions weaken the relationship between the lead plaintiff and class counsel
and specifically reduce the ability of the lead plaintiff to exert control over liti-
gation decisionmaking.  Second, both trends lead to serious problems in imple-
menting the lead plaintiff provision.  Finally, the trends maintain an active judi-
cial role in supervising the conduct of the litigation.
294. See Judith Resnick, Managerial Judging, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982) (describing the incen-
tives that influence judges’ managerial decisions).
295. See, e.g., In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 788 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(concluding that the claim was viable because it survived a motion to dismiss and estimating probable
class recovery as within the “$4.6 to $4.8 billion range”).
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The problems described in this article should cause courts to think carefully
about the effects of accepting either trend.  Courts that use aggregation to ap-
point groups of unrelated investors as lead plaintiffs will continue to be in-
volved in difficult questions of appropriate group size and composition.  To the
extent that courts defer to groups created by counsel, they are unfaithful to the
objectives of the statute.  Moreover, lead plaintiff groups are unlikely to func-
tion in accordance with the statutory design.  In particular, there is little reason
to believe that a lead plaintiff group can effectively select or monitor class coun-
sel.
Selection of lead counsel by auction is not an attractive alternative.  Lead
counsel auctions present substantial issues in design and implementation.
Moreover, the lead plaintiff provision itself eliminates the justification for an
auction.  There is little reason to believe that a judicially conducted auction can
replicate the market process or result in a selection decision and fee award
more appropriate than the decisions made by a suitable lead plaintiff.
Furthermore, both aggregation and auctions involve the court in a danger-
ous role.  By increasing the court’s involvement in the selection of the lead
plaintiff and, in particular, the selection of class counsel, aggregation and auc-
tions risk the court’s neutrality.  The effect of these trends is to enhance judicial
empowerment at the expense of client control.  In passing the PSLRA, Con-
gress adopted precisely the opposite approach to litigation reform.
